Space stability appears to be eroding as a growing number of states acquire the ability to degrade or destroy U.S. space assets. The United States needs a coordinated national space deterrence strategy designed to operate on both sides of a potential adversary's cost-benefit decision calculus. Future research will determine the most effective and affordable mix of strategies, policies, and systems for strengthening space deterrence.

The authors examine the application of classical deterrence theory to the space domain and argue that to build a tailored deterrence strategy for China in space, China's own objectives should be considered.

The impact of strategic defenses on stability is a central theme in the Strategic Defense Initiative debate. This report examines the effects of defenses on first-strike stability. It is principally concerned with assessing first-strike stability during the transition from an offense-dominated strategic balance to a defense-dominated balance. It also examines the implications of various offensive and defensive force structures. The findings suggest that (1) first-strike instability during the defense transition can be minimized by careful force planning; (2) the most stable defense transition occurs when the ballistic missile defense transition is completed before significant levels of air defense are deployed; (3) arms control efforts will not necessarily reduce potential first-strike instabilities unless each side's counterforce capability is reduced; (4) asymmetries in each side's ability to suppress the opponent's defenses can lead to instabilities during, and after, the defense transition; and (5) biased perceptions make the defense transition either more or less stable, depending on the nature of the bias.

This overview aims to inform the public discussion of space-based weapons by examining their characteristics, potential attributes, limitations, legality, and utility. The authors do not argue for or against space weapons, nor do they estimate the potential costs and performance of specific programs, but instead sort through the realities and myths surrounding space weapons in order to ensure that debates and discussions are based on fact.

With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.

This book examines the drivers behind great power security competition in space to determine whether realistic strategic alternatives exist to further militarization. Space is an area of increasing economic and military competition. This book offers an analysis of actions and events indicative of a growing security dilemma in space, which is generating an intensifying arms race between the US, China, and Russia. It explores the dynamics behind a potential future war in space and investigates methods of preventing an arms race from an international relations theory and military-strategy standpoint. The book is divided into three parts: the first section offers a broad discussion of the applicability of international relations theory to current conditions in space; the second is a direct application of theory to the space environment to determine whether competition or cooperation is the optimal strategic choice; the third section focuses on testing the hypotheses against reality, by analyzing novel alternatives to three major categories of space systems. The volume concludes with a study of the practical limitations of applying a strategy centered on commercialization as a method of defusing the orbital security dilemma. This book will be of interest to students of space power, strategic studies, and international relations.