This paper examines whether decisions about the appropriate exchange rate regime in six Central American countries were based on longer-run economic fundamentals or on the confluence of historical and political circumstances. To uncover any actual relationship both across countries and across time, we estimate several probit and multinomial logit models of exchange rate regime choice with data spanning the period 1974-2001. We find that theoretical long-run determinants, such as trade openness, export share with the major trading partner, economic size, and per capita income, are adequate, but not robust, predictors of exchange rate regime choice. However, we were not able to establish a statistically significant association between the terms of trade fluctuations or capital account openness and a particular regime in any specification using our sample.

In this paper we first explain why most microstates (countries with less than 2 million inhabitants) have gained independence only in the last 30 years. Despite the higher costs and risks microstates face, their ability to better accommodate local preferences combined with a more integrated world economy probably explains why the benefits of independence have risen. We explain why microstates at independence have chosen either dollarization, currency board arrangements, or fixed exchange rates rather than more flexible forms of exchange rate systems. We then, using the Geweke-Hajvassiliou-Keane multivariate normal simulator, model empirically the determinants of each of the different fixed exchange rate regimes in microstates and analyze the policy implications.

In recent years, analysts and policy makers alike have been evaluating the nexus between exchange rates and macroeconomic stability. Among the most important questions is why have some countries adopted rigid, including fixed, exchange-rate paper addresses this question from a political economy perspective both theoretically and empirically. The model assumes that the monetary authority minimizes a quadratic loss function that captures the trade-off between infla- tion and unemployment. This framework is initially applied to the case where monetary authorities must choose between a (permanently) fixed and a flexible exchange-rate regime. In choosing the regime it is assumed authorities compare the expected losses under each scenario. The model is subsequently extended extended to cover the somewhat more complicated case where the authoriities must choose between fixed-but-adjustable and flexible exchange-rate regimes. In this latter case, potential political costs of abandoningithe pegged rate are taken into account. In the empirical section, an unbalanced panel data set of 63 countries from 1980-1992 is used to estimate a series of probit models, with a binary exchange-rate regime index as the dependent variable. Among the most important explanatory variables were measures of countries' historical degree of political instability, measures of the probability of abandoning pegged rates, and variables related to the relative importance of real (unemployment) targets in the preferences of monetary authorities. The regression results support the political economy approach developed in the theoretical discussion.

Traditionally the choice of exchange rate regime has been seen as a second-best policy choice, which can be directed toward mitigating the distortionary effects of price or information rigidities. In this paradigm the optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility is found to depend of the source and nature of shocks hitting an economy. More recent literature views the exchange rate as a widely and frequently seen manifestation of government policy with careful exchange-rate management emerging as a tool that can enhance shaky policy credibility.

Using recent advances in the classification of exchange rate regimes, this paper finds no support for the popular bipolar view that countries will tend over time to move to the polar extremes of free float or rigid peg. Rather, intermediate regimes have shown remarkable durability. The analysis suggests that as economies mature, the value of exchange rate flexibility rises. For countries at a relatively early stage of financial development and integration, fixed or relatively rigid regimes appear to offer some anti-inflation credibility gain without compromising growth objectives. As countries develop economically and institutionally, there appear to be considerable benefits to more flexible regimes. For developed countries that are not in a currency union, relatively flexible exchange rate regimes appear to offer higher growth without any cost in credibility.

In this paper, we investigate how economic, political and institutional factors affect the choice of exchange rate regimes, using data on eight MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries over the 1984-2016 period. Specifically, we run random-effects ordered probit regressions of the likelihood of exchange rate regimes on potential determinants of exchange rate regimes. Three important findings emerge from the analysis. i) Political and institutional factors play an important role in determining the exchange rate regime in MENA countries: a democratic political regime and a low level of corruption increases the probability to opt for a fixed regime. While, strong governments, political stability such as less internal conflicts and more government stability, more law and order enforcement and left-wing Government decreases the probability to opt for a fixed regime. ii) Bureaucracy, independent central banks, elections, terms of trade as well as the monetary independence have no effect on the choice of exchange rate regimes. iii) Financial development is not a robust determinant of the choice of exchange rate regimes. Our results still hold when considering alternative specifications and have important implications for policy makers in MENA countries.