Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) some management spent considerable time and effort guiding analyst earnings estimates, often through detailed reviews of analysts' earnings models. In this paper I use proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute to identify firms that reviewed analysts' earnings models prior to Reg FD and those that did not. Under the maintained assumption that firms conducting reviews implicitly or explicitly guided analysts' earnings forecasts, I document firm characteristics associated with the decision to provide private managerial earnings guidance. Then, I document the characteristics of 'guided' versus 'unguided' analyst earnings forecasts. Findings demonstrate an association between several firm characteristics and guidance practices: managers are more likely to review analyst earnings models when the firm's stock is highly followed by analysts and largely held by institutions, when the firm's market-to-book ratio is high, and its earnings are important to valuation (high Industry-ERC R2), but hard to predict because its business is complex (high # of Segments). A comparison of guided and unguided quarterly forecasts indicates that guided analyst estimates are more accurate, but also more frequently pessimistic. An examination of analysts' annual earnings forecasts over the fiscal year does not distinguish between guidance and no guidance firms; both experience a quot;walk downquot; in annual estimates. To distinguishing between guidance and no guidance firms, one must examine quarterly earnings news: unguided analysts walk down their annual estimates when the majority of the quarterly earnings news is negative, guided analysts walk down their annual estimates even though the majority of the quarterly earnings news is positive.

Abstract: Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure some management spent considerable time and effort guiding analyst earnings estimates; other management did not. In this paper I examine the determinants and consequences of management's decision to work with analysts in the development of their earnings estimates using proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute. Findings suggest that when earnings are important to valuation but hard to forecast because businesses and financial transactions are complex, management is more likely to provide assistance to analysts presumably to avoid inaccurate analyst forecasts and negative earnings surprises. A comparison of guided and unguided analyst forecasts indicates that guided quarterly earnings forecasts are more accurate but also more frequently pessimistic, consistent with analysts rationally trading offbias for accuracy to retain access to management's earnings guidance. Cross-sample comparisons of analysts' stock recommendations and long-term growth forecasts provide additional support for the hypothesis that analyst objectivity and independence is affected by management's decision to provide earnings guidance. Finally, evidence from stock price reactions to deviations from the consensus forecast (the traditional measure of earnings surprises) indicates that investors distinguish between guided and unguided analyst forecasts when forming their earnings expectations. This study furthers our understanding of what factors affect management's disclosure choices and how managers' disclosure choices influence the objectivity and independence of sell-side analysts.

We examine management forecasts to determine whether Regulation Fair Disclosure has improved the quality and quantity of public disclosures. Management forecasts are voluntary, provide earnings guidance and are highly sought by investors and analysts. We find that the information disclosed by managers has improved in terms of frequency, specificity and verifiable information provided. We also find that Regulation Fair Disclosure has reduced information asymmetry, and information leakage prior to the release of the MEF. We find no evidence of greater returns volatility. Our results suggest that generally Regulation Fair Disclosure has achieved one of its stated goals of providing a more level playing field to all investors.

"I develop and explore a new dimension of earnings guidance - guidance consistency. Contrary to the conventional view that managers make an independent guidance decision each period, I find empirical support for the dynamic disclosure theory, which argues that managers consider earnings guidance as a multi-period decision and try to maintain consistency in guidance. Once I account for past guidance in a logistic model, several known guidance determinants are no longer significant in explaining management guidance decisions. In contrast, past guidance remains significant both statistically and economically across various specifications, suggesting that management guidance decisions are largely predetermined. Moreover, the guidance consistency measure is more robust than the conventional frequency-based 'habitual' variable in explaining future guidance. The results still hold in a Heckman selection model and after propensity score matching, mitigating the concern that guidance consistency is merely driven by firms operating in stable environments. Moreover, firms with a history of consistent (inconsistent) guidance are less (more) responsive to various guidance determinants, and omit guidance primarily due to lack of private information (past unsuccessful expectation management). Compared with inconsistent guiders, consistent guiders are more likely to: (a) guide earlier in the quarter; (b) bundle guidance with earnings announcements; (c) issue guidance even when analyst forecasts are already aligned with managers' own estimates; and (d) also maintain consistency in their guidance timing or specificity. After controlling for analyst forecasts before guidance, their forecasts after guidance are more likely to be aligned with guidance issued by consistent guiders than by inconsistent guiders. My evidence suggests that both managers and analysts view guidance as a multi-period decision, supporting the dynamic disclosure theory"--Page iv.

A guide to dealing with Wall Street in order to boost a company's earnings and stock price features advice for executives on such topics as addressing investors' concerns and maintaining credibility on Wall Street.

The safe harbor provisions have increased over the years, following the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1996 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) of 1998. The objective is to encourage more earnings guidance by managers. However, a number of firms like Coca Cola and Gillette moved to abandon quantitative earnings forecasts, due to concerns over the markets' response when they miss their forecasts. This study examines the determinants of management earnings forecasts bias and inaccuracy. The evidence suggests that forecast bias and inaccuracy are not systematically associated with diversification however, are associated with the fraction of nonoperating assets. Also, capital structure, audit quality and institutional holdings are systematic determinants of forecast bias and inaccuracy. Finally, industry attributes of munificence, dynamism and concentration are indicators of inherent imperfections of management forecasts, but are exogenous to management's control. The reasons for, and implications of these findings are discussed.

We provide archival evidence on how a particular type of supplementary information affects the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Managers often provide detailed forecasts of specific income statement line items to shed light on how they plan to achieve their bottom-line earnings targets. We assess the effect of this forecast disaggregation on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Based on a relatively large hand-collected sample of 900 management earnings forecasts, we find that disaggregation increases analysts' sensitivity to the news in managers' earnings guidance, suggesting that analysts find the guidance more credible. More importantly, we identify several factors that influence this relation. First, disaggregation plays a more important role when earnings are otherwise more difficult to forecast. Second, disaggregation is more important after Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibited selective disclosure, especially for firms that were more affected because they had previously provided more private guidance. Finally, in contrast to common assertions in the prior literature, we find that in more recent years, disaggregation matters more for guidance that conveys bad news. Managers as well as researchers should be interested in evidence suggesting that financial analysts find disaggregation especially helpful in contexts where managers' credibility is particularly important.