The Crimean War was the most destructive conflict of Queen Victoria's reign, the outcome of which was indecisive; most historians regard it as an irrelevant and unnecessary conflict despite its fame for Florence Nightingale and the Charge of the Light Brigade. Here Hugh Small shows how the history of the Crimean War has been manipulated to conceal Britain's – and Europe's – failure. The war governments and early historians combined to withhold the truth from an already disappointed nation in a deception that lasted over a century. Accounts of battles, still widely believed, gave fictitious leadership roles to senior officers. Careful analysis of the fighting shows that most of Britain's military successes in the war were achieved by the common soldiers, who understood tactics far better than the officer class and who acted usually without orders and often in contravention of them. Hugh Small's mixture of politics and battlefield narrative identifies a turning point in history, and raises disturbing questions about the utility of war.

The letters home to his family by Gerald Goodlake, a young officer in the Coldstream Guards, make remarkable reading. They vividly describe the ill-preparedness of the British Army and the dire conditions experienced by all ranks in the Crimea. Goodlake's views on senior officers were frank to say the least! Most important, Goodlake's initiative and courage in organising and leading what were 'Special Forces' were rewarded by the award of one of the first Victoria Crosses. Goodlake served in the Crimea from early 1854 to the end two years later.

This work focuses upon the military problems of the Ottoman Empire in the era 1839 to 1878. The author examines the Crimean War (1853 to 1856) from the perspective of the Ottoman army, using British and French sources, as well as the few available Ottoman materials. Scholarship on the war has ignored this aspect, but the high quality of work about the British, French, and Russian involvement in the war has enabled the present study to advance its own work. The inability of the Ottoman high command to learn the lessons of the Crimean War led to serious defeats in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Revolts occurring in this period also receive attention. While the book analyzes the nature of war in the Balkans and Anatolia, its primary objective is the study of the war's social and psychological influences. This perspective runs as a theme throughout the book, but the author focuses on the psychological aspects in the final chapter using comparative perspectives. .