Private participation in the development of natural gas distribution networks is often introduced through the award of exclusive concessions for defined geographic zones. Designing such franchises in a megacity poses a challenge in striking a balance between economies of scale (few distributors) and information disclosure for regulation (more distributors). Approaches to making these and related tradeoffs are analyzed through a case study of Mexico City.

After a banking crisis, when authorities have decided to use budgetary funds to help restructure a large failed bank or banking system, apparent conflicts between various goals (involving incentives for the new bank management, for the government's budget, and for monetary stability) can be resolved by suitably designing financial instruments and appropriately allocating responsibility between different arms of government.

Organizing individual retirement accounts through the institutional market and with constrained choice could substantially lower administrative costs. The tradeoff: rebidding problems, weaker performance incentives, inflexibility in the face of unforeseen contingencies, and an increased probability of corruption, collusion, and regulatory capture.

The author examines the special role that trade liberalization in services industries can play in stimulating trade in both services, and goods. International trade in goods requires inputs from such trade services as transportation, insurance, and finance, for example. Restrictions on services across borders, and within foreign countries add costs, and barriers to international trade. Liberalizing trade in services could also facilitate trade in goods, providing more benefits than one might expect from analysis merely of the services trade. To emphasize the point, the author notes that the benefits for trade are arguably enhanced by the phenomenon of fragmentation. The more that production processes become split across locations, with the fragments tied together, and coordinated by various trade services, the greater the gains from reductions in the costs of services. The incentives for such fragmentation can be greater across countries, than within countries, because of the greater differences in factor prices, and technologies. But the service costs of international fragmentation can also be larger, especially if regulations, and restrictions impede the international provision of services. As a result, trade liberalization in services can stimulate the fragmentation of production of both goods, and services, thus increasing international trade, and the gains from trade even further. Since fragmentation seems to characterize an increasing portion of world specialization, the importance of service liberalization is growing apace.

The poor in most parts of the world may have electricity (especially in urban areas), but they rarely have water, sewer, and telephone services. When they gain access to local services, however, many do decide to connect.