Sustainable public debt has gained renewed attention as countries implement fiscal consolidation measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Sound public debt policies and debt management practices require robust legal underpinnings. Complex legal issues however arise in the design of the legal framework, and tradeoffs are required in many instances. This paper analyzes key features of modern public debt management legal frameworks, drawing from examples in advanced, emerging, and frontier markets. It aims to provide guidance for countries that seek to review and strengthen their public debt management legal frameworks.

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Debt opacity burdens the public and can exacerbate debt vulnerabilities in many countries. Both low-income and developing countries and emerging market economies have critical gaps in debt transparency, and the implementation of international standards and guidelines has lagged. The paper surveys the legal frameworks of sixty jurisdictions and reveals the critical weaknesses that hinder debt transparency, which include weak reporting obligations, limited coverage of public debt, inadequate monitoring, unclear borrowing and delegation processes, unfettered confidentiality arrangements and weak accountability mechanisms. Because laws entrench practices and bind the discretion of policy makers and debt managers alike, subjecting them to public scrutiny, legal reform is a necessary part of any solution to the problem of hidden debt, though it may entail a difficult and time intensive process in many jurisdictions.

The Revised Guidelines for Public Debt Management have been developed as part of a broader work program undertaken by the IMF and the World Bank to strengthen the international financial architecture, promote policies and practices that contribute to financial stability and transparency, and reduce countries external vulnerabilities.

Sustainable public debt has gained renewed attention as countries implement fiscal consolidation measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Sound public debt policies and debt management practices require robust legal underpinnings. Complex legal issues however arise in the design of the legal framework, and tradeoffs are required in many instances. This paper analyzes key features of modern public debt management legal frameworks, drawing from examples in advanced, emerging, and frontier markets. It aims to provide guidance for countries that seek to review and strengthen their public debt management legal frameworks.

Historically, international financial crises do not occur in isolation but rather go hand in hand with the deterioration of macroeconomic indicators, investor panic and speculation. Since the beginning of the 20th century, experts in international law have periodically discussed the possible remedies to the endemic situation of sovereign indebtedness. In 2001, the International Monetary Fund launched a proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism known as the 'Krueger Plan'; this was quickly abandoned in 2003. Due to the present economic and political cul-de-sac, the legal framework of sovereign debt management strongly preoccupies the international community. The current sovereign debt scenario necessarily involves an irreversible disruption of the legal rules and structures that currently support a proper functioning global economy. This doctoral thesis analyses the evolution of the legal framework and the normative choices favoured by each actor. By identifying particular legal issues that are essential to evaluate the subject's complexity, it is possible to deepen the theoretical and practical suggestions designed to facilitate the resolution of sovereign debt crises. After establishing the leading international requirements for sovereign debt management, this dissertation advocates the implementation of a normative set of tools designed to integrate domestic regulations on the basis of previous models.

This paper proposes a sovereign asset and liability management framework for analyzing the inter-relationships between debt management, fiscal and monetary policies. It illustrates the consequences of uncoordinated policy mix and extends Sargent and Wallace (1981 and 1993) by including debt management. Examples of policy games played by fiscal, monetary, and debt management authorities reinforce the importance of policy separation and coordination to prevent domination by one authority over another which could lead to inconsistent policy mix.