Recent regulatory initiatives in the United States have again raised the issue of a 'level regulatory and supervisory playing field' and the degree of competition globally between over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and organized derivative exchange (ODE) markets. This paper models some important aspects of how an ODE market interrelates with the OTC markets. It analyzes various ways in which an ODE market can respond to competition from the OTC markets and considers whether ODE markets would actually benefit from a more level playing field. Among other factors, such as different transaction costs, different abilities to mitigate credit risk play a significant role in determining the degree of competition between the two types of markets. This implies that a potentially important service ODE markets can provide OTC market participants is to extend clearing services to them. Such services would allow the OTC markets to focus more on providing less competitive contracts/innovations and instead customize its contracts to specific investors' risk preferences and needs.

New regulatory data reveal extensive price discrimination against non-financial clients in the FX derivatives market. The client at the 90th percentile pays an effective spread of 0.5%, while the bottom quarter incur transaction costs of less than 0.02%. Consistent with models of search frictions in over-the-counter markets, dealers charge higher spreads to less sophisticated clients. However, price discrimination is eliminated when clients trade through multi-dealer request-for-quote platforms. We also document that dealers extract rents from captive clients and market opacity, but only for contracts negotiated bilaterally with unsophisticated clients.

In The Social Life of Financial Derivatives Edward LiPuma theorizes the profound social dimensions of derivatives markets and the processes, rituals, and belief systems that drive them. In response to the 2008 financial crisis and drawing on his experience trading derivatives, LiPuma outlines how they function as complex devices that organize speculative capital as well as the ways derivative-driven capitalism not only produces the conditions for its own existence, but also penetrates the fabric of everyday life. Framing finance as a form of social life and highlighting the intrinsically social character of financial derivatives, LiPuma deepens our understanding of derivatives so that we may someday use them to serve the public well-being.

In 2007, a stranger-than-fiction multibillion-dollar bidding war for the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) erupted between the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and Atlanta’s IntercontinentalExchange (ICE). Zero-Sum Game: The Rise of the World’s Largest Derivatives Exchange takes readers behind the scenes of this battle to tell the gripping—and often comical—story of how the historic merger between CME and CBOT almost didn’t happen. Author Erika S. Olson, a managing director at CBOT during the bidding war, delivers a blow-by-blow account of the fight for the world’s oldest futures exchange, taking you inside CBOT’s landmark Chicago Loop headquarters, onto the high-octane trading floor, and into executives’ offices. Through the lens of the CME/CBOT deal, Zero-Sum Game: Introduces the colorful and outspoken personalities who call the shots in this close-knit and frequently misunderstood industry Details the reasons behind the recent, spectacular growth of a market that’s existed for over 160 years Explains how derivatives affect the lives of average consumers worldwide by influencing everything from interest rates on credit cards to the cost of a cheeseburger to the price of a gallon of gas Reveals the inner workings of futures exchanges, and differentiates the various types of derivatives that are routinely lumped together and vilified by the media Erika S. Olson is a former managing director of the Chicago Board of Trade and spent over ten years working in and consulting to the financial services industry. She received her MBA from Harvard Business School and her BBA from the University of Michigan Ross School of Business.

To mitigate systemic risk, some regulators have advocated the greater use of centralized counterparties (CCPs) to clear Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives trades. Regulators should be cognizant that large banks active in the OTC derivatives market do not hold collateral against all the positions in their trading book and the paper proves an estimate of this under-collateralization. Whatever collateral is held by banks is allowed to be rehypothecated (or re-used) to others. Since CCPs would require all positions to have collateral against them, off-loading a significant portion of OTC derivatives transactions to central counterparties (CCPs) would require large increases in posted collateral, possibly requiring large banks to raise more capital. These costs suggest that most large banks will be reluctant to offload their positions to CCPs, and the paper proposes an appropriate capital levy on remaining positions to encourage the transition.