The U.S. military has a stockpile of approximately 400,000 tons of excess, obsolete, or unserviceable munitions. About 60,000 tons are added to the stockpile each year. Munitions include projectiles, bombs, rockets, landmines, and missiles. Open burning/open detonation (OB/OD) of these munitions has been a common disposal practice for decades, although it has decreased significantly since 2011. OB/OD is relatively quick, procedurally straightforward, and inexpensive. However, the downside of OB and OD is that they release contaminants from the operation directly into the environment. Over time, a number of technology alternatives to OB/OD have become available and more are in research and development. Alternative technologies generally involve some type of contained destruction of the energetic materials, including contained burning or contained detonation as well as contained methods that forego combustion or detonation. Alternatives for the Demilitarization of Conventional Munitions reviews the current conventional munitions demilitarization stockpile and analyzes existing and emerging disposal, treatment, and reuse technologies. This report identifies and evaluates any barriers to full-scale deployment of alternatives to OB/OD or non-closed loop incineration/combustion, and provides recommendations to overcome such barriers.

What does the future hold for the U.S> Amry's asrsenals and ammunition plants?

The Department of the Army meets its materiel requirements principally through purchase from private sources. However, the Army produces certain ordnance-related items and performs some ordnance-related services in a set of arsenals, ammunition plants, other ammunition activities, and depots. The Army operates some of these facilities; contractors operate others. Although this set of facilities has been reduced since the end of the Cold War, the remaining facilities still operate at less than their full capacity today. The unused and underused capacity raises questions about how many of these facilities the Army needs, how large they need to be, and who should own and operate them. This report represents the third phase of a multiyear study that examines the Army's ordnance industrial base and makes recommendations about these issues.