Using the economic approach of social choice theory, this unique book examines difficulties found in democratic processes involved in the creation and implementation of planning policies. Social choice theory focuses on the hard trade-offs to be made between rationality in decision-making on the one hand, and political values such as democracy, liberalism and freedom from manipulation on the other. As an institution can be seen as a set of rules, the focus on rules and procedures of collective choice makes social choice theory well suited for analysing important political aspects of planning institutions. Special attention is given to communicative planning and the logical reasons why all the desirable properties of dialogue cannot be simultaneously attained. The analysis provides original and significant new insights into the process and the institutions involved. It highlights weak spots of present planning techniques and procedures and suggests further steps towards institutionally enriched planning theory.

This book offers a comprehensive overview and critique of the most important political and philosophical interpretations of the basic results of social choice, assessing their plausibility and seeking to identify the links between the theory of social choice and the more traditional issues of political theory and philosophy. In this regard, the author eschews a strong methodological commitment or technical formalism; the approach is instead based on the presentation of political facts and illustrated via numerous real-life examples. This allows the reader to get acquainted with the philosophical and political dispute surrounding voting and collective decision-making and its links to social choice theory.

Democratic Economic Planning presents a concrete proposal for how to organize, carry out, and integrate comprehensive annual economic planning, investment planning, and long-run development planning so as to maximize popular participation, distribute the burdens and benefits of economic activity fairly, achieve environmental sustainability, and use scarce productive resources efficiently. The participatory planning procedures proposed provide workers in self-managed councils and consumers in neighbourhood councils with autonomy over their own activities while ensuring that they use scarce productive resources in socially responsible ways without subjecting them to competitive market forces. Certain mathematical and economic skills are required to fully understand and evaluate the planning procedures discussed and evaluated in technical sections in a number of chapters. These sections are necessary to advance the theory of democratic planning, and should be of primary interest to readers who have those skills. However, the book is written so that the main argument can be followed without fully digesting the more technical sections. Democratic Economic Planning is written for dreamers who are disenamored with the economics of competition and greed want to know how a system of equitable cooperation can be organized; and also for sceptics who demand "hard proof" that an economy without markets and private enterprise is possible.

The mathematical theory of voting has intellectual roots extending back two centuries to the writings of Borda and Condorcet. Yet it has only been in the last forty years that general theorems have begun to emerge. With the publication of this volume, Norman Schofield brings the results together in a, common framework. SOCIAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRACY, however, is not merely a synthetic exercise, for Schofield's own work over the last decade has constituted a major initiative in deepening and' broadening our general understanding of voting arrangements. At last the results of his research, bits and pieces of which have been reported in a number of journals of international standing and in various collections, are coherently and systematically presented as an entirety. For students of democracy -- chiefly philosophers and political scientists, but increasingly economists as well -- the insights of this volume are profound. From it I infer the following.

“Continuing his career-long exploration of modern democracy, Dahl addresses a question that has long vexed students of political theory: the place of independent organizations, associations, or special interest groups within the democratic state.”—The Wilson Quarterly “There is probably no greater expert today on the subject of democratic theory than Dahl….His proposal for an ultimate adoption here of a ‘decentralized socialist economy,’ a system primarily of worker ownership and control of economic production, is daring but rational, reflecting his view that economic inequality seems destined to become the major issue here it historically has been in Europe.”—Library Journal “Dahl reaffirms his commitment to pluralist democracy while attempting to come to terms with some of its defects.”—Laura Greyson, Worldview “Anyone who is interested in these issues and who makes the effort the book requires will come away the better for it. And more. He will receive an explanation for our current difficulties that differs considerably from the explanation for our current difficulties that differs considerably from the explanation offered by the Reagan administration, and a prescription for the future which differs fundamentally from the nostrums emanating from the White House.”—Dennis Carrigan, The (Louisville, Kentucky) Courier-Journal

The thrust of the theory of preference aggregation is that it is impossible to design institutions guaranteeing collective decisions that are both consistent and fair. Proponents of deliberative democracy have used this as an argument for decision-making based on dialogue rather than voting. Communicative public planning - producing plans through public participation exercises - is seen as an integral part of deliberative democracy. It is argued here, however, that the inclusive dialogue of this style of planning cannot promise escape from arbitrariness and does not necessarily deliver improved local decision-making.