This book addresses the development, and the challenges and impediments, to democratic oversight and review of the intelligence community in Australia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, the US and UK. The promotion of democratic oversight of the intelligence community has gained renewed significance in the aftermath of 9/11.

These days, it's rare to pick up a newspaper and not see a story related to intelligence. From the investigations of the 9/11 commission, to accusations of illegal wiretapping, to debates on whether it's acceptable to torture prisoners for information, intelligence—both accurate and not—is driving domestic and foreign policy. And yet, in part because of its inherently secretive nature, intelligence has received very little scholarly study. Into this void comes Reforming Intelligence, a timely collection of case studies written by intelligence experts, and sponsored by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School, that collectively outline the best practices for intelligence services in the United States and other democratic states. Reforming Intelligence suggests that intelligence is best conceptualized as a subfield of civil-military relations, and is best compared through institutions. The authors examine intelligence practices in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, as well as such developing democracies as Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, and Russia. While there is much more data related to established democracies, there are lessons to be learned from states that have created (or re-created) intelligence institutions in the contemporary political climate. In the end, reading about the successes of Brazil and Taiwan, the failures of Argentina and Russia, and the ongoing reforms in the United States yields a handful of hard truths. In the murky world of intelligence, that's an unqualified achievement.

This book features a comparative study in intelligence accountability and governance across the Five Eyes: the imperative for member countries of the world's most powerful intelligence alliance to reconcile democracy and security through transparent standards, guidelines, legal frameworks, executive directives, and international law. It argues that intelligence accountability is best understood not as an end in itself but as a means that is integral democratic governance. On the one hand, to assure the executive of government and the public that the activities of intelligence agencies are lawful and, if not, to identify breaches in compliance. On the other hand, to raise awareness of and appreciation for the intelligence function, and whether it is being carried out in the most effective, efficient, and innovative way possible to achieve its objective. The analysis shows how the addition of legislative and judicial components to executive and administrative accountability has been shaping evolving institutions, composition, practices, characteristics, and cultures of intelligence oversight and review in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand using a most-similar systems design. Democracies are engaged in an asymmetric struggle against unprincipled adversaries. Technological change is enabling unprecedented social and political disruption. These threat vectors have significantly affected, altered, and expanded the role, powers and capabilities of intelligence organizations. Accountability aims to reassure sceptics that intelligence and security practices are indeed aligned with the rules and values that democracies claim to defend.

In a world that is increasingly unstable, intelligence services like the American CIA and the United Kingdom's MI6 exist to deliver security. Whether the challenge involves terrorism, cyber-security, or the renewed specter of great power conflict, intelligence agencies mitigate threats and provide decisional advantage to national leaders. But empowered intelligence services require adequate supervision and oversight, which must be about more than the narrow (if still precarious) task of ensuring the legality of covert operations and surveillance activities. Global Intelligence Oversight is a comparative investigation of how democratic countries can govern their intelligence services so that they are effective, but operate within frameworks that are acceptable to their people in an interconnected world. The book demonstrates how the institutions that oversee intelligence agencies participate in the protection of national security while safeguarding civil liberties, balancing among competing national interests, and building public trust in inherently secret activities. It does so by analyzing the role of courts and independent oversight bodies as they operate in countries with robust constitutional frameworks and powerful intelligence services. The book also illuminates a new transnational oversight dynamic that is shaping and constraining security services in new ways. It describes how global technology companies and litigation in transnational forums constitute a new form of oversight whose contours are still undefined. As rapid changes in technology bring the world closer together, these forces will complement their more traditional counterparts in ensuring that intelligence activities remain effective, legitimate, and sustainable.

Experts from around the globe look at protecting secrets while maintaining liberties

The events of September 11, 2001 sharply revived governmental and societal anxieties in many democratic countries concerning the threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, and other complex security threats. In many countries, public discourse of subjects traditionally considered part of social policy, such as immigration and asylum, have been securitized, while intelligence services have been granted greater resources and expanded powers. This comprehensive volume discusses the various challenges of establishing and maintaining accountable and democratically controlled intelligence services, drawing both from states with well-established democratic systems and those emerging from authoritarian systems and in transition towards democracy. It adopts a multidisciplinary and comparative approach, identifying good practices to make security services accountable to society and its democratic representatives. The volume will engage both academics and practitioners in the discussion of how to anchor these vital yet inherently difficult to control institutions within a firmly democratic framework. As such, it has clear relevance for these concerned with the control and oversight of intelligence and security issues in many countries.

This study offers the first detailed examination of the varied means by which parliament through its committees and the work of individual members has sought to scrutinise the British intelligence and security agencies and the government's use of intelligence.