Focusing on the protection of rights in the UK, this book establishes a framework for interactions to better protect rights, facilitate deliberation, engage citizens, and provide for checks and balances. It further evaluates how well these values are achieved in the UK constitution now, and in light of a British Bill of Rights and Brexit.

Identifies how and why 'dialogue' can describe and evaluate institutional interactions over constitutional questions concerning democracy and rights.

In a comprehensive examination of the constitutional systems of Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, Po Jen Yap contributes to a field that has traditionally focussed on Western jurisdictions. Drawing on the history and constitutional framework of these Asian law systems, this book examines the political structures and traditions that were inherited from the British colonial government and the major constitutional developments since decolonization. Yap examines the judicial crises that have occurred in each of the three jurisdictions and explores the development of sub-constitutional doctrines that allows the courts to preserve the right of the legislature to disagree with the courts' decisions using the ordinary political processes. The book focusses on how these novel judicial techniques can be applied to four core constitutional concerns: freedom of expression, freedom of religion, right to equality, and criminal due process rights. Each chapter examines one core topic and defends a model of dialogic judicial review that offers a compelling alternative to legislative or judicial supremacy.

Constitutional law is clearly shaped by judicial actors. But who else contributes? Scholars in the past have recognized that the legislative branch plays a significant role in determining structural issues, such as separation of powers and federalism, but stopped there--claiming that only courts had the independence and expertise to safeguard individual and minority rights. In this readable and engaging narrative, the authors identify the nuts and bolts of the national dialogue and relate succinct examples of how elected officials and the general public often dominate the Supreme Court in defining the Constitution's meaning. Making use of case studies on race, privacy, federalism, war powers, speech, and religion, Devins and Fisher demonstrate how elected officials uphold individual rights in such areas as religious liberty and free speech as well as, and often better than, the courts. This fascinating debunking of judicial supremacy argues that nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights.

From one of our leading scholars of comparative constitutionalism, advice for everyone involved in the surprisingly common practice of constitution-writing Enhancing prospects for democracy is an important objective in the process of creating a new constitution. Donald L. Horowitz argues that constitutional processes ought to be geared to securing commitment to democracy by those who participate in them. Using evidence from numerous constitutional processes, he makes a strong case for a process intended to increase the likelihood of a democratic outcome. He also assesses tradeoffs among various process attributes and identifies some that might impede democratic outcomes. This book provides a fresh perspective on constitutional processes that will interest students and scholars. It also offers sound advice for everyone involved in the surprisingly common practice of constitution‑writing.

In The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy John Agresto traces the development of American judicial power, paying close attention to what he views as the very real threat of judicial supremacy. Agresto examines the role of the judiciary in a democratic society and discusses the proper place of congressional power in constitutional issues. Agresto argues that while the separation of congressional and judicial functions is a fundamental tenet of American government, the present system is not effective in maintaining an appropriate balance of power. He shows that continued judicial expansion, especially into the realm of public policy, might have severe consequences for America's national life and direction, and offers practical recommendations for safeguarding against an increasingly powerful Supreme Court. John Agresto's controversial argument, set in the context of a historical and theoretical inquiry, will be of great interest to scholars and students in political science and law, especially American constitutional law and political theory.