Most American citizens are quick to criticize federal bureaucracy for its size and inefficiency. They assume it has exceeded the intent of our nation's founders; yet men like James Madison and Alexander Hamilton knew that good public administrators were essential to good government. William Richardson here examines the origins, legitimacy, and limitations of public administration from the perspective of the Founders' thought. He shows that these men—especially the authors of The Federalist—advocated an energetic public administration as an essential component of government and even considered the emergence of a "natural aristocracy" of virtuous civil servants. The Founders would see the fault of today's federal bureaucracy, argues Richardson, not as much in its size as in the character of its members. Richardson relates the Founders' belief that the nation should strive to produce public servants committed to developing character traits, such as wisdom and moderation, that would exemplify the highest ideals of the republic and thus ensure its survival. They anticipated some self-interest on the part of administrators, but believed it would be held in check by public opinion and the political process. To test the success of the Founders' ideal, Richardson examines both the character of administrators and the role of ethics in forming that character. He explores the various plans for educating public leaders throughout American history and looks at how attitudes toward public administration have changed in this century, from Woodrow Wilson's scientific ideal to recent proposals to downsize government. Among other suggestions, Richardson advocates reforming existing institutions by emphasizing character. Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Character is an exercise in legitimizing public administration, offering important insights into the Founders' thoughts that can be applied to today's debate over government bureaucracy. Public administration may be problematic by nature, observes Richardson, but it is crucial to our form of government. Through his analysis we can see that, while bureaucracy and democracy have long had an uneasy relationship, neither can be effective unless we fully assess the place and purpose of character in the American regime.

A timely new perspective on the impact of populism on the relationship between democracy and public administration.

Those who implement policies have the discretion to shape democratic values. Public administration is not policy administered, but democracy administered.

Based mainly on State Department materials, but addressing generic problems of organizational politics as well, this book provides a fresh, intelligent, and lively account of bureaucratic behavior.

In Bureaucracy’s Masters and Minions: The Politics of Controlling the U.S. Bureaucracy, the author argues that political control of the bureaucracy from the president and the Congress is largely contingent on an agency’s internal characteristics of workforce composition, workforce responsibilities, and workforce organization. Through a revised principal-agent framework, the author explores an agent-principal model to use the agent as the starting-point of analysis. The author tests the agent-principal model across 14 years and 132 bureaus and finds that both the president and the House of Representatives exert influence over the bureaucracy, but agency characteristics such as the degree of politization among the workforce, the type of work the agency is engaged in, and the hierarchical nature of the agency affects how agencies are controlled by their political masters. In a detailed case study of one agency, the U.S. Department of Education, the author finds that education policy over a 65-year period is elite-led, and that that hierarchical nature of the department conditions political principals’ influence. This book works to overcome three hurdles that have plagued bureaucratic studies: the difficulty of uniform sampling across the bureaucracy, the overuse of case studies, and the overreliance on the principal-agent theoretical approach.

Corruption and ineffectiveness are often expected of public servants in developing countries. However, some groups within these states are distinctly more effective and public oriented than the rest. Why? Patchwork Leviathan explains how a few spectacularly effective state organizations manage to thrive amid general institutional weakness and succeed against impressive odds. Drawing on the Hobbesian image of the state as Leviathan, Erin Metz McDonnell argues that many seemingly weak states actually have a wide range of administrative capacities. Such states are in fact patchworks sewn loosely together from scarce resources into the semblance of unity. McDonnell demonstrates that when the human, cognitive, and material resources of bureaucracy are rare, it is critically important how they are distributed. Too often, scarce bureaucratic resources are scattered throughout the state, yielding little effect. McDonnell reveals how a sufficient concentration of resources clustered within particular pockets of a state can be transformative, enabling distinctively effective organizations to emerge from a sea of ineffectiveness. Patchwork Leviathan offers a comprehensive analysis of successful statecraft in institutionally challenging environments, drawing on cases from contemporary Ghana and Nigeria, mid-twentieth-century Kenya and Brazil, and China in the early twentieth century. Based on nearly two years of pioneering fieldwork in West Africa, this incisive book explains how these highly effective pockets differ from the Western bureaucracies on which so much state and organizational theory is based, providing a fresh answer to why well-funded global capacity-building reforms fail—and how they can do better.

Author Ludwig von Mises was concerned with the spread of socialist ideals and the increasing bureaucratization of economic life. While he does not deny the necessity of certain bureaucratic structures for the smooth operation of any civilized state, he disagrees with the extent to which it has come to dominate the public life of European countries and the United States. The author's purpose is to demonstrate that the negative aspects of bureaucracy are not so much a result of bad policies or corruption as the public tends to think but are the bureaucratic structures due to the very tasks these structures have to deal with. The main body of the book is therefore devoted to a comparison between private enterprise on the one hand and bureaucratic agencies/public enterprise on the other.