Economic Policy and the Great Stagflation discusses the national economic policy and economics as a policy-oriented science. This book summarizes what economists do and do not know about the inflation and recession that affected the U.S. economy during the years of the Great Stagflation in the mid-1970s. The topics discussed include the basic concepts of stagflation, turbulent economic history of 1971-1976, anatomy of the great recession and inflation, and legacy of the Great Stagflation. The relation of wage-price controls, fiscal policy, and monetary policy to the Great Stagflation is also elaborated. This publication is beneficial to economists and students researching on the history of the Great Stagflation and policy errors of the 1970s.

This paper analyses the dynamic effects of aggregate demand, supply and oil price shocks on GDP and unemployment in Germany, Norway, the UK and the USA, and establishes the role of the different shocks in explaining output fluctuations over time. Symmetries of economic fluctuations across countries are also examined. The different shocks are identified by imposing dynamic restrictions on a structural vector autoregression model. For all countries except Norway, oil price shocks have significant negative effects on output. However, whereas the oil price shock in 1973-74 triggered off a global recession, the recession in the early 1980s was largely caused by other disturbances.

Building on recent work on the role of speculation and inventories in oil markets, we embed a competitive oil storage model within a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. This enables us to formally analyze the impact of a (speculative) storage demand shock and to assess how the effects of various demand and supply shocks change in the presence of oil storage facility. We find that business-cycle driven oil demand shocks are the most important drivers of U.S. oil price fluctuations during 1982-2007. Disregarding the storage facility in the model causes a considerable upward bias in the estimated role of oil supply shocks in driving oil price fluctuations. Our results also confirm that a change in the composition of shocks helps explain the resilience of the macroeconomic environment to the oil price surge after 2003. Finally, speculative storage is shown to have a mitigating or amplifying role depending on the nature of the shock.

United States monetary policy has traditionally been modeled under the assumption that the domestic economy is immune to international factors and exogenous shocks. Such an assumption is increasingly unrealistic in the age of integrated capital markets, tightened links between national economies, and reduced trading costs. International Dimensions of Monetary Policy brings together fresh research to address the repercussions of the continuing evolution toward globalization for the conduct of monetary policy. In this comprehensive book, the authors examine the real and potential effects of increased openness and exposure to international economic dynamics from a variety of perspectives. Their findings reveal that central banks continue to influence decisively domestic economic outcomes—even inflation—suggesting that international factors may have a limited role in national performance. International Dimensions of Monetary Policy will lead the way in analyzing monetary policy measures in complex economies.

We develop a model of aggregate supply and demand in the open economy to explain the important characteristics of international macroeconomic adjustment in the 1970s. Traditional demand-oriented models cannot account for the worldwide phenomenon of rising inflation and unemployment in the mid-70s, or for the failure of most industrialized economies to recover from the deep recession of 1974-75. When aggregate supply is carefully treated, it is found that much of the inflation and sluggish output performance may be attributed to the jump in the real costs of intermediate inputs and the failure of real wages to adjust downward after the input price shock. A simulation model shows that fuel inputs are sufficiently important in production that a large part of the worldwide recession may be attributed to the change in the relative price of oil, since 1973. In an empirical section, it is suggested that countries differ in their response to supply shocks and macro-policies because of differences in key structural relationships, particularly in wage determination