The case of Stefan Kiszko casts a dark shadow over British justice. Totally unconnected to the murder of which he was convicted—that of a young girl Lesley Molseed—he spent 16 years in prison tormented as a sex-offender and suffering from what one expert described as ‘delusions of innocence’. As author Michael O’Connell explains, it was in fact the system by which he was ensnared which was suffering from ‘delusions of guilt’. Kiszko could not have been Lesley’s attacker as subsequently established by DNA and the medical fact that he could not produce sperm. But a false confession written for him by a corrupt police officer set in train proceedings from which he was never to recover, dying only a short time after his eventual release. In this book, Michael O’Connell investigates every small detail of the case with especial reference to the foibles of the lawyers, investigators and scientists involved, all of whom either missed or ignored the signs that should have pointed to an early discharge from a misguided prosecution. The book includes the participation of a prosecutor who went on to become Lord Chief Justice and a leading defence barrister who became Home Secretary before his elevation to the House of Lords. Everyone seems to have become caught up in the momentum originally fuelled by policing methods that are hopefully now long gone. The most detailed treatment available. Contains Kiszko’s original confession and retraction. Explains the points at which the case went wrong. Looks at the motivations of those involved.

In an ideal world, our beliefs would satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as foster the acquisition, retention, and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis. We may also experience impairments in perception, memory, learning, and reasoning in the course of our lives. Such limitations and impairments give rise to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, and beliefs that are elaborated delusional, motivated delusional, or optimistically biased. In this book, Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where, in some contexts, the adoption, maintenance, or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs, yet it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade-off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness, which in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.

The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together recent work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and psychiatry, offering a comprehensive review of the philosophical issues raised by the psychology of normal and abnormal cognition.

A new perspective on the roles of psychopathology, confirmation bias, false confessions, the media and internet (amongst other causes) of unjust accusations. Putting lack of empathy at the fore in terms of police, prosecutors and others, it considers a wide range of other psychopathological aspects of miscarriages of justice. By looking at three high profile cases, those of Amanda Knox and Raffaele Sollecito (Italy), Stefan Kiszko (UK) and Darlie Routier (USA)—the authors show that motive forces are a mind-set in which psychopathy (what they term ‘constitutional negative empathy’) may be present and the need to reinforce existing supposition or lose face plays a large part.

This fresh edition of Satish Sekar’s classic work brings events up to date as at 2017 and includes matters that the author was prevented from publishing sooner. Among other things it deals with the collapse of the 2011 trial of police officers and others concerning the original miscarriage of justice in this case and in a new Epilogue calls for a Truth and Justice Commission. The author shows how this extreme miscarriage of justice destroyed families, divided communities and undermined confidence in the criminal justice system. The book takes the reader from the sadistic killing of Lynette White in Cardiff in 1988, via the subsequent investigation and trial to the aftermath of the folding of the 2011 trial over ‘lost’ documents that later materialised. But above all it deals with the hard scientific facts of the first vindication case of the DNA-age.