The White Paper, 'Delivering a sustainable railway' (Cm. 7176, ISBN 9780101717625) published on July 2007 and set the Government's general vision for the railways for the next thirty years. Network Rail's engineering overruns at New Year 2008 caused tremendous inconvenience to passengers across the country and inevitably shaped the Committee's oral evidence sessions. The Committee's investigation, along with analyses from the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) have led them to believe that the engineering overruns are symptonatic of crucial system flaws which have to be resolved if there is to be any hope of getting a sustainable railway, as promised in the White Paper. This report covers both subjects

A White Paper, dated July 2007. The Rail Technical Strategy published by the DfT is available separately (ISBN 9780115528903)

Railways are frequently promoted as one of the most sustainable modes of transport. However, their impact will in practice be significantly affected by the ways in which they are designed, constructed, and used. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the issues involved in planning, engineering and operating sustainable railway systems.

The Transport Committee believes there is a good case for a high speed rail network, linking London and the major cities of the Midlands, the North and Scotland. But the Government must firmly commit to the Y network (to Leeds and Manchester) before seeking parliamentary approval for HS2. If it decides to go ahead with HS2, it should publish a summary of the financial case showing how the project is affordable alongside sustained investment in the classic network. A full assessment of the case for building from north to south should be carried out. The disputed travel time savings should be addressed in an updated economic case. The Committee is concerned that the Government is developing separate strategies for rail and aviation, with HS2 separate from both, and calls again for the publication of a comprehensive transport strategy. The Government should look again at the case for a direct link to Heathrow, and costs and benefits of routing HS2 via Heathrow should be set out more clearly. Better information is needed on: the proposals for London termini and linkages; risk factors of operating 18 trains per hour at 225mph; the location of stations on the Y network; environmental impacts. Claims that HS2 would deliver substantial carbon-reduction benefits do not stand up to scrutiny. The Government should desist from disparaging opponents of high speed rail as NIMBYs. Both sides in the debate should show respect for each other and focus on the facts.

This book offers a timely analysis of the UK government's sustainable transport policy 10 years after the publication of A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone.

A contextualised study setting out the foundations of administrative law, with discussion of case law and legislation to show practical application.

The Department for Transport has done well so far to contain the infrastructure costs for the Thameslink Programme within the original budget. Phase one of the Programme cost £1.704 billion, was completed on time and was £143 million under budget. However, delays of more than three years in agreeing the contract to buy new trains mean that delivering value for money from the Programme as a whole is at greater risk than the National Audit Office would have expected at this stage. There continues to be a robust transport case for the £3.552 billion (at 2006 prices) Programme. Thameslink services have consistently been among the most crowded London routes with passengers amongst the least satisfied with space on trains; and demand is forecast to increase. The Department estimates that the Programme will make net present benefits of £2.9 billion through reduced journey times, reduced overcrowding on trains and quicker interchanges between services. The Department needs to manage a complex interaction between completing the infrastructure project; buying new trains; and letting a new franchise. Delays to any of these projects can delay significantly or complicate delivery of other parts of the Programme. The award of the estimated £1.6 billion contract to buy new trains is currently delayed by over three years and this has implications for the rest of the programme. And until the contract is let it will not be clear whether delivery of the whole Programme by 2018 is still feasible.