What role do the people play in defining and developing human rights? This volume explores the very topical issue of the lack of democratic legitimisation of national and international courts and the question of whether rendering the original process of defining human rights more democratic at the national and international level would improve the degree of protection they afford. The authors venture to raise the crucial question: When can a democratic society be considered to be mature enough so as to be trusted to provide its own definition of human rights obligations?

What role do the people play in defining and developing human rights?This volume explores the very topical issue of the lack of democratic legitimisation of national and international courts and the question of whether rendering the original process of defining human rights more democratic at the national and international level would improve the degree of protection they afford.The authors venture to raise the crucial question: When can a democratic society be considered to be mature enough so as to be trusted to provide its own definition of human rights obligations?

Sovereignty marks the boundary between politics and law. Highlighting the legal context of politics and the political context of law, it thus contributes to the internal dynamics of both political and legal systems. This book comprehends the persistence of sovereignty as a political and juridical concept in the post-sovereign social condition. The tension and paradoxical relationship between the semantics and structures of sovereignty and post-sovereignty are addressed by using the conceptual framework of the autopoietic social systems theory. Using a number of contemporary European examples, developments and paradoxes, the author examines topics of immense interest and importance relating to the concept of sovereignty in a globalising world. The study argues that the modern question of sovereignty permanently oscillating between de iure authority and de facto power cannot be discarded by theories of supranational and transnational globalized law and politics. Criticising quasi-theological conceptualizations of political sovereignty and its juridical form, the study reformulates the concept of sovereignty and its persistence as part of the self-referential communication of the systems of positive law and politics. The book will be of considerable interest to academics and researchers in political, legal and social theory and philosophy.

In 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing its member states to take measures to protect Libyan civilians from Muammar Gadhafi’s forces. In invoking the “responsibility to protect,” the resolution draws on the principle that sovereign states are responsible and accountable to the international community for the protection of their populations and that the international community can act to protect populations when national authorities fail to do so. The idea that sovereignty includes the responsibility to protect is often seen as a departure from the classic definition, but it actually has deep historical roots. In Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect, Luke Glanville argues that this responsibility extends back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and that states have since been accountable for this responsibility to God, the people, and the international community. Over time, the right to national self-governance came to take priority over the protection of individual liberties, but the noninterventionist understanding of sovereignty was only firmly established in the twentieth century, and it remained for only a few decades before it was challenged by renewed claims that sovereigns are responsible for protection. Glanville traces the relationship between sovereignty and responsibility from the early modern period to the present day, and offers a new history with profound implications for the present.

This book argues that the introduction of popular sovereignty as the basis for government in France facilitated a dramatic transformation in international law in the eighteenth century.

What role do the people play in defining and developing human rights? This volume explores the very topical issue of the lack of democratic legitimisation of national and international courts and the question of whether rendering the original process of defining human rights more democratic at the national and international level would improve the degree of protection they afford. The authors venture to raise the crucial question: When can a democratic society be considered to be mature enough so as to be trusted to provide its own definition of human rights obligations?