In human rights adjudication, courts sometimes face issues that they lack the expertise or constitutional legitimacy to resolve. One way of dealing with such issues is to 'defer', or accord a margin of appreciation, to the judgments of public authorities. This raises two important questions: what devices courts should use to exercise deference, and how deference can be made more workable for judges and predictable for litigants. Combining in-depth conceptual analysis with practice in a broad range of jurisdictions, Deference in Human Rights Adjudication answers these questions. It introduces six devices for deference (namely, the burden of proof, standard of proof, standard of review, giving of weight, choice of interpretation, and choice of remedy), analyzes how courts should choose amongst them, and proposes techniques for rendering deference practicable. The book has two distinctive features. First, it engages with the jurisprudence of six common law jurisdictions that apply a structured proportionality test in rights adjudication, namely, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Second, it offers guidelines for judges who wish to apply its theoretical arguments. As such, Deference in Human Rights Adjudication will enable human rights adjudication to be more principled and in line with the rule of law and separation of powers. Insightful and pioneering, this book will be an important reference for researchers, teachers, and students of constitutional theory, comparative constitutional law, and human rights law around the world. It will also assist practitioners, judges, and policymakers who have to grapple with issues of deference in adjudication.

A rigorous analysis of the relationship between proportionality and deference under the Human Rights Act.

International courts and tribunals are increasingly asked to pass judgment on matters that are traditionally considered to fall within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Especially in the fields of human rights, investment, and trade law, international adjudicators commonly evaluate decisions of national authorities that have been made in the course of democratic procedures and public deliberation. A controversial question is whether international adjudicators should review such decisions de novo or show deference to domestic authorities. This book investigates how various international courts and tribunals have responded to this question. In addition to a comparative analysis, the book provides a normative argument, discussing whether different forms of deference are justified in international adjudication. It proposes a distinction between epistemic deference, which is based on the superior capacity of domestic authorities to make factual and technical assessments, and constitutional deference, which is based on the democratic legitimacy of domestic decision-making. The book concludes that epistemic deference is a prudent acknowledgement of the limited expertise of international adjudicators, whereas the case for constitutional deference depends on the relative power of the reviewing court vis-à-vis the domestic legal order.

"Introduction Deference and the International Adjudication of Private Property Disputes While working as a government lawyer in 2011, a letter came into our office advising that the Philip Morris tobacco company had decided to sue Australia under a bilateral investment treaty. The company contended that Australia's tobacco plain packaging requirements breached its intellectual property rights, entitling it to billions of dollars in compensation under international law. This news was not particularly shocking to the small team of which I was part, which had been assembled within the government's Office of International Law to respond to these types of claims. The news was shocking, though, to the wider Australian community. Over the ensuing months, the community's disbelief became better-articulated in the press: How can an international tribunal sit in judgment over a measure which the Australian Parliament had decided was in the public interest after extensive scientific enquiry and public consultation? Could an international tribunal really reverse the finding of Australia's highest court that the legislation was lawful?"--

What does it mean to interpret the constitution? Does constitutional interpretation involve moral reasoning, or is legal reasoning something different? What does it mean to say that a limit on a right is justified? How does judicial review fit into a democratic constitutional order? Are attempts to limit its scope incoherent? How should a jurist with misgivings about the legitimacy of judicial review approach the task of judicial review? Is there a principled basis for judicial deference? Do constitutional rights depend on the protection of a written constitution, or is there a common law constitution that is enforceable by the courts? How are constitutional rights and unwritten constitutional principles to be reconciled? In this book, these and other questions are debated by some of the world's leading constitutional theorists and legal philosophers. Their essays are essential reading for anyone concerned with constitutional rights and legal theory.

This book examines how the judicialization of politics, and the politicization of courts, affect representative democracy, rule of law, and separation of powers. This volume critically assesses the phenomena of judicialization of politics and politicization of the judiciary. It explores the rising impact of courts on key constitutional principles, such as democracy and separation of powers, which is paralleled by increasing criticism of this influence from both liberal and illiberal perspectives. The book also addresses the challenges to rule of law as a principle, preconditioned on independent and powerful courts, which are triggered by both democratic backsliding and the mushrooming of populist constitutionalism and illiberal constitutional regimes. Presenting a wide range of case studies, the book will be a valuable resource for students and academics in constitutional law and political science seeking to understand the increasingly complex relationships between the judiciary, executive and legislature.