The role of intelligence in US government operations has changed dramatically and is now more critical than ever to domestic security and foreign policy. This authoritative and highly researched book written by Jeffrey T. Richelson provides a detailed overview of America's vast intelligence empire, from its organizations and operations to its management structure. Drawing from a multitude of sources, including hundreds of official documents, The US Intelligence Community allows students to understand the full scope of intelligence organizations and activities, and gives valuable support to policymakers and military operations. The seventh edition has been fully revised to include a new chapter on the major issues confronting the intelligence community, including secrecy and leaks, domestic spying, and congressional oversight, as well as revamped chapters on signals intelligence and cyber collection, geospatial intelligence, and open sources. The inclusion of more maps, tables and photos, as well as electronic briefing books on the book's Web site, makes The US Intelligence Community an even more valuable and engaging resource for students.

With billions of computers in existence, cyberspace, 'the virtual world created when they are connected,' is said to be the new medium of power. Computer hackers operating from anywhere can enter cyberspace and take control of other people's computers, stealing their information, corrupting their workings, and shutting them down. Modern societies and militaries, both pervaded by computers, are supposedly at risk. As Conquest in Cyberspace explains, however, information systems and information itself are too easily conflated, and persistent mastery over the former is difficult to achieve. The author also investigates how far 'friendly conquest' in cyberspace extends, such as the power to persuade users to adopt new points of view. He discusses the role of public policy in managing cyberspace conquests and shows how the Internet is becoming more ubiquitous and complex, such as in the use of artificial intelligence.

Countering Cyber Sabotage: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) introduces a new methodology to help critical infrastructure owners, operators and their security practitioners make demonstrable improvements in securing their most important functions and processes. Current best practice approaches to cyber defense struggle to stop targeted attackers from creating potentially catastrophic results. From a national security perspective, it is not just the damage to the military, the economy, or essential critical infrastructure companies that is a concern. It is the cumulative, downstream effects from potential regional blackouts, military mission kills, transportation stoppages, water delivery or treatment issues, and so on. CCE is a validation that engineering first principles can be applied to the most important cybersecurity challenges and in so doing, protect organizations in ways current approaches do not. The most pressing threat is cyber-enabled sabotage, and CCE begins with the assumption that well-resourced, adaptive adversaries are already in and have been for some time, undetected and perhaps undetectable. Chapter 1 recaps the current and near-future states of digital technologies in critical infrastructure and the implications of our near-total dependence on them. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the origins of the methodology and set the stage for the more in-depth examination that follows. Chapter 4 describes how to prepare for an engagement, and chapters 5-8 address each of the four phases. The CCE phase chapters take the reader on a more granular walkthrough of the methodology with examples from the field, phase objectives, and the steps to take in each phase. Concluding chapter 9 covers training options and looks towards a future where these concepts are scaled more broadly.

The founding principles of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were the collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security amongst its member countries. Conceived in a Cold War environment, the Alliance has endured strategic changes through major conflicts and global power shifts that eventually led to the fall of the Warsaw Pact. After a brief period where some pundits questioned its relevancy, NATO has experienced a renaissance of its core security functions with the adoption of a new Strategic Concept in 2010.The development of cyberspace defense capabilities for NATO has been making steady progress since its formal introduction at the North Atlantic Council Prague Summit in 2002. Bolstered by numerous cyber attacks such as those in Estonia in 2007, Alliance priorities were formalized in subsequent NATO cyber defense policies that were adopted in 2008, 2011, and 2014.This monograph examines the past and current state of NATO's cyberspace defense efforts by assessing the appropriateness and sufficiency of them to address anticipated threats to member countries, including the United States. This analysis focuses on the recent history of NATO's cyberspace defense efforts and how changes in NATO's strategy and policy writ large embrace the emerging nature of cyberspace for military forces, as well as other elements of power. In general, the topics presented are well documented in many sources. Thus, this monograph serves as a primer for current and future operations and provides senior policymakers, decision-makers, military leaders, and their respective staffs with an overall appreciation of existing capabilities as well as the challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with cyberspace-related operations in the NATO context. The scope of this discussion is limited to unclassified and open source information; any classified discussion must occur within other venues. This monograph has three main sections: * NATO Cyberspace Capability: Strategy and Policy. This section examines the evolution of the strategic foundations of NATO cyber activities, policies, and governance as they evolved over the past 13 years. It analyzes the content of the summit meetings of the NATO North Atlantic Council for material related to cyber defense. It also summarizes the evolution of NATO formal cyber defense policy and governance since 2002.* NATO Cyberspace Capability: Military Focus. NATO cyber defense mission areas include NATO network protection, shared situational awareness in cyberspace, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism, support to member country cyber capability development, and response to crises related to cyberspace. This section explores these mission areas by examining the operations and planning, doctrine and methods, and training and exercises related to NATO military cyberspace activities.* Key Issues for Current Policy. The new Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy affirms the role that NATO cyber defense contributes to the mission of collective defense and embraces the notion that a cyber attack may lead to the invocation of Article 5 actions for the Alliance. Against this backdrop, this section examines the related issues of offensive cyberspace, deterrence in and through cyberspace, legal considerations, and cooperation with the European Union.This monograph concludes with a summary of the main findings from the discussion of NATO cyberspace capabilities and a brief examination of the implications for Department of Defense and Army forces in Europe. Topics include the roles and evolution of doctrine, deterrence, training, and exercise programs, cooperation with industry, and legal standards.NATO cyberspace activities face many challenges that must be assessed and prioritized on a recurring basis by policymakers.

Information and communication technologies now play a big part in the daily personal and professional lives of us all. Cyberspace – the interconnected digital technology domain which underlies communications, transportation, state administration, finance, medicine and education – is part of all our lives. In the last decade, the digital revolution in the South Eastern European (SEE) countries has given more people there access to communication, education, and news than ever before, and we should not underestimate the power of these information and communication technologies. This book presents papers from the NATO Science for Peace and Security Advanced Training Course (ATC) Toward Effective Cyber Defense in Accordance With the Rules of Law, held in Ohrid, Republic of North Macedonia, in November 2019. The course focused on the SEE countries, where, in general, governments have paid appropriate attention to developing cyber defense capacities. In some cases, however, limitations in technological resources have restricted the capabilities of governments to respond to the ever-evolving challenges of defending the cyber domain. Laws and regulations differ from country to country, and the topics covered here were carefully chosen to cover issues in laws and regulations, cyber defense policies and their practical implementation. The series of papers presented in this book will provide a deeper understanding of these topics for scholars, associated professionals in the public and private sectors, and for a more general audience.

In a world of increasing dependence on information technology, the prevention of cyberattacks on a nation's important computer and communications systems and networks is a problem that looms large. Given the demonstrated limitations of passive cybersecurity defense measures, it is natural to consider the possibility that deterrence might play a useful role in preventing cyberattacks against the United States and its vital interests. At the request of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Research Council undertook a two-phase project aimed to foster a broad, multidisciplinary examination of strategies for deterring cyberattacks on the United States and of the possible utility of these strategies for the U.S. government. The first phase produced a letter report providing basic information needed to understand the nature of the problem and to articulate important questions that can drive research regarding ways of more effectively preventing, discouraging, and inhibiting hostile activity against important U.S. information systems and networks. The second phase of the project entailed selecting appropriate experts to write papers on questions raised in the letter report. A number of experts, identified by the committee, were commissioned to write these papers under contract with the National Academy of Sciences. Commissioned papers were discussed at a public workshop held June 10-11, 2010, in Washington, D.C., and authors revised their papers after the workshop. Although the authors were selected and the papers reviewed and discussed by the committee, the individually authored papers do not reflect consensus views of the committee, and the reader should view these papers as offering points of departure that can stimulate further work on the topics discussed. The papers presented in this volume are published essentially as received from the authors, with some proofreading corrections made as limited time allowed.