Contents: (1) Background; (2) Managing Contractors during Contingency Contracting; (3) Number and Roles of Contractors in CENTCOM, in Iraq, in Afghanistan; (4) Efforts to Improve Contractor Management and Oversight; (5) Contractors in DoD Strategy and Doctrines: (a) Can Contractors Undermine U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan?; (b) DoD Strategy and Doctrine: The National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review; Field Manual on Operations; Field Manual on Counterinsurgency; New Doctrine, DoD Instructions, and Other Efforts; (6) Selected Congressional Hearings and Legislation; (7) Contract Management, Oversight, and Coordination: Training Contractors and the Military in Contingency Contracting. Illus.

This report examines DoD logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq and Afghanistan administered through the U.S. Army¿s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), as well as legislative initiatives which may impact the oversight and management of logistical support contracts for the delivery of troop support services. LOGCAP is an initiative designed to manage the use of civilian contractors that perform services during times of war and other military mobilizations. Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Major Developments: AF Contract, and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program; (3) Background: Awarding of Defense Contracts; (4) Potential Oversight Issues: Contract Oversight and Admin.; Use of Overhead Fees; Gansler Comm.

Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Services Provided by Private Security Contractors (PSC); Number and Profile of PSCs Working in Iraq and Afghanistan; Congressional Focus on PSCs; (3) Private Security Co. Working for the U.S. Gov¿t.: Why the U.S. Gov¿t. Uses PSCs; DoD PSCs; Iraq; Afghanistan; Can the Use of PSCs Undermine U.S. Efforts?; DoD Mgmt. and Oversight of PSCs; (4) Options for Congress: Define the Role that Private Security Contractors Can Play in Support of Mil. Operations in Unsecure Environments; Prohibit armed security contractors from being deployed in combat zones; Restrict armed security contractors to performing static security; Restrict armed security contractors to static security, with an exception for local nationals.

Over the past decade, America's military and federal-civilian employees, as well as contractors, have performed vital and dangerous tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan. Contractors' support however, has been unnecessarily costly, and has been plagued by high levels of waste and fraud. The United States will not be able to conduct large or sustained contingency operations without heavy contractor support. Avoiding a repetition of the waste, fraud, and abuse seen in Iraq and Afghanistan requires either a great increase in agencies' ability to perform core tasks and to manage contracts effectively, or a disciplined reconsideration of plans and commitments that would require intense use of contractors. Failure by Congress and the Executive Branch to heed a decade's lessons on contingency contracting from Iraq and Afghanistan will not avert new contingencies. It will only ensure that additional billions of dollars of waste will occur and that U.S. objectives and standing in the world will suffer. Worse still, lives will be lost because of waste and mismanagement.

The use of private security contractors (PSCs) to protect personnel and property in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a subject of debate. While PSCs are viewed as being vital to U.S. efforts in the region, many are concerned about transparency, accountability, and legal issues raised by the use of armed civilians to perform security tasks formerly performed by the mil. Contents of this report: Legal Status and Authorities: (a) Internat. Law: Can Contractors be Combatants?; Are They Mercenaries?; (b) Iraqi Law, and Afghan Law, and Status of U.S. Forces; (c) U.S. Law; ¿Inherently Gov¿t. Functions¿ and Other Restrictions on Gov¿t. Contracts; Prosecution of Contractor Personnel in U.S. Fed. or Mil. Courts; Uniform Code of Mil. Justice.

The critical role contractors play in supporting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq necessitates that the Department of Defense (DOD) effectively manage contractors during contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract management can delay or even prevent troops from receiving needed support and can also result in wasteful spending. Some analysts believe that poor contract management has played a role in permitting abuses and crimes committed by certain contractors against local nationals, which may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This report examines logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq and Afghanistan (for Afghanistan, beginning with LOGCAP IV) administered through the U.S. Armys Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP is an initiative designed to manage the use of civilian contractors that perform services during times of war and other military mobilizations. On April 18, 2008, DOD announced the Armys LOGCAP IV contract awards to three companies - DynCorp International LLC, Fort Worth, TX; Fluor Intercontinental, Inc, Greenville, SC; and KBR, Houston, TX, through a full and open competition. The LOGCAP IV contract calls for each company to compete for task orders. Each company may be awarded up to $5 billion annually for troop support services with a maximum annual value of $15 billion. Over the life of LOGCAP IV, the maximum contract value is $150 billion. Under LOGCAP IV, the U.S. Army Sustainment Command awarded the first performance task order on September 25, 2008 to Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., for logistical support services in Afghanistan. Congress is concerned about the Federal oversight and management of DOD contracting in Iraq, particularly under LOGCAP. Recent assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOD Office of the Inspector General (DOD-IG), and the ...