Since FY 2000, the DoD has significantly increased the number of major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. However, acquisition outcomes have not improved. In most cases, the programs failed to deliver capabilities when promised -- often forcing warfighters to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. This testimony describes the systemic problems that have contributed to poor cost and schedule outcomes in DoD¿s acquisition of major weapon systems; recent actions DoD has taken to address these problems; and steps that Congress and DoD need to take to improve the future performance of DoD¿s major weapon programs. Illustrations.

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must Prioritize Its Weapon System Acquisitions and Balance Them with Available Resources

A broad consensus exists that weapon system problems are serious, but efforts at reform have had limited impact. Last year, it was reported that DoD's portfolio of weapon programs experienced cost growth of $295 billion from first estimates, were delayed by an average of 21 months, and delivered fewer quantities and capabilities to the war-fighter than originally planned. This testimony describes the systemic problems that contribute to the cost, schedule, and performance problems in weapon system programs, recent actions that DoD has taken to address these problems, proposed reform legislation that has recently been introduced, and additional steps needed to improve future performance of acquisition programs. Charts and tables.

In 2006, the cumulative cost growth in DoD¿s portfolio of 96 major defense acquisition programs was $296 billion and the average delay in delivering promised capabilities to the warfighter was 22 months. These are very poor outcomes. The auditor has used metrics to review the mgmt. and health of these programs from within the framework of best practices. This testimony discusses: (1) ¿knowledge metrics,¿ used to determine how well programs manage tech., design, and manufacturing risks; (2) outcome metrics -- concerning cost, schedule, and capability -- that serve as ¿health indicators¿ of how well programs are being executed in terms of predicted outcomes; and (3) the prerequisites that must be met in order for a program¿s plans and goals to be realistic.

The authors analyze various approaches to speed acquisition of military capabilities and keep pace with evolving threats, assess these approaches' suitability for different conditions and acquisition types, and identify implementation issues.