The book provides a theoretical and practical foundation for understanding the use of force by criminal justice practitioners and to provide examples of "best practices" for the use of force that incorporate research, principles, and philosophies. Chapter 1 discusses the background of the use of force by criminal justice practitioners, walking the reader through the history and the purpose of the use of force before turning to a discussion of the extent of force. This chapter deals with issues of police professionalism, character, and ethics. Chapter 2 considers the assessment of risk when faced with the possibility of using force against a suspect. A four stage Predatory Prevention Matrix is presented that helps pinpoint opportunities for proactive prevention efforts to quell suspect use of violence at the earliest stages. The four stages involve policy, control, risk, and phases of an attack and offer three levels (primary, secondary, and tertiary) for criminal justice intervention. Chapter 3 advises on the development of departmental use of force policies. The use of force continuum is described, which guides officers on appropriate levels of force, from simple officer presence to verbal direction, soft and hard empty hand control, and defensive and less-than-lethal tactics. Chapter 4 explores use of force training philosophies, perspectives, and techniques. The author explores training standards and programs, as well as the scope of use of force techniques, before presenting a model of best practices in use of force training.

Saratoga weaves together the political, strategic, tactical, and operational aspects of this decisive Revolutionary War campaign. Supported by original maps, engaging appendices, and extensive end notes, Luzader's magisterial study is simply history at its finest--Cover.

How aggressive military strategies win wars, from ancient times to today The goal of war is to defeat the enemy's will to fight. But how this can be accomplished is a thorny issue. Nothing Less than Victory provocatively shows that aggressive, strategic military offenses can win wars and establish lasting peace, while defensive maneuvers have often led to prolonged carnage, indecision, and stalemate. Taking an ambitious and sweeping look at six major wars, from antiquity to World War II, John David Lewis shows how victorious military commanders have achieved long-term peace by identifying the core of the enemy's ideological, political, and social support for a war, fiercely striking at this objective, and demanding that the enemy acknowledges its defeat. Lewis examines the Greco-Persian and Theban wars, the Second Punic War, Aurelian's wars to reunify Rome, the American Civil War, and the Second World War. He considers successful examples of overwhelming force, such as the Greek mutilation of Xerxes' army and navy, the Theban-led invasion of the Spartan homeland, and Hannibal's attack against Italy—as well as failed tactics of defense, including Fabius's policy of delay, McClellan's retreat from Richmond, and Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler. Lewis shows that a war's endurance rests in each side's reasoning, moral purpose, and commitment to fight, and why an effectively aimed, well-planned, and quickly executed offense can end a conflict and create the conditions needed for long-term peace. Recognizing the human motivations behind military conflicts, Nothing Less than Victory makes a powerful case for offensive actions in pursuit of peace.

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.