The literature on fiscal federalism has amply discussed both the potential efficiency and welfare gains from decentralization and the potential trade-offs between decentralization and income redistribution. By contrast, it has generally put less emphasis on the effects of decentralization on macroeconomic management, although policymakers worldwide increasingly have to grapple with these effects. This paper examines the constraints that a high degree of decentralization can place on the ability of the central government to carry out its traditional macroeconomic management functions and explores various ways to minimize these constraints.

Suggests guidelines by which developing countries can successfully manage the rapid surge in government revenues that occurs during a commodity boom. The book addresses the problems associated with such booms, including long-term spending commitments, Dutch disease, and a slowdown in diversification.

Several of the transition economies are devolving fiscal authority to subnational governments at a time when it is also important to consolidate fiscal policy. This can be problematic because, without appropriate care, the central government's ability to determine the level and structure of revenues, public spending, and borrowing may well diminish as fiscal policy is devolved. This paper focuses on how the center can maintain its ability to conduct fiscal policy while devolving revenue, spending, and borrowing powers to lower levels of government. Empirical evidence shows that countries with good governance have maintained fiscal control despite a high degree of fiscal devolution. And decentralization is associated with better fiscal outcomes for middle-income countries with strong governance. Fiscal management issues are explored in four key areas: budget coordination mechanisms at the macro level tax-effort incentives and revenue-sharing mechanisms expenditure control and hard-budget constraints and criteria and rules for borrowing.

November 1998 Shah concludes that, contrary to a common misconception, decentralized fiscal systems offer more potential for improved macroeconomic governance than do centralized fiscal systems, because they require greater clarity about the roles of various players and decisionmakers and-to ensure fair play-greater transparency in rules governing interactions. In analyzing the institutional environment for macroeconomic management, Shah discusses monetary policy, fiscal policy, and subnational borrowing. In analyzing the macroeconomic dimensions of securing an economic union, he discusses the regulatory environment, tax coordination, transfer payments and social insurance, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and regional equity. Finally, he discusses the challenges of globalization and draws lessons from experience about fiscal reform in developing countries: Among them: * Monetary policy is best entrusted to an independent central bank with a mandate for price stability. * Fiscal rules accompanied by gatekeeper intergovernmental councils or committees provide a useful framework for fiscal discipline and coordination of fiscal policy. * The integrity and independence of the financial sector contribute to fiscal prudence in the public sector. * To ensure fiscal discipline, governments at all levels must be made to face the financial consequences of their decisions. * Societal norms and consensus about the roles of various levels of government and limits to their authority are vital to the success of decentralized decisionmaking. * Tax decentralization is a prerequisite for subnational access to credit markets. * Higher-level institutional assistance may be needed to finance local capital projects. * An internal common market is best preserved by constitutional guarantees. * Intergovernmental transfers in developing countries undermine fiscal discipline and accountability while building transfer dependencies that cause a slow economic strangulation of fiscally disadvantaged regions. * Periodic review of jurisdictional assignments is essential to realign responsibilities with changing economic and political realities. * Finally, and contrary to a common misconception, decentralized fiscal systems offer more potential for improved macroeconomic governance than do centralized fiscal systems. This paper-a product of the Country and Regional Relations Division, Operations Evaluation Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to learn lessons of experience in improving public sector performance in developing countries. The author may be contacted at [email protected].

Fiscal rules binding on all levels can help sustain political commitment in countries having coalitions or fragmented regimes in power. Coordinating institutions help in the use of moral suasion to encourage a coordinated response. Industrial countries' experiences also show that unilaterally imposed federal controls and constraints on subnational governments typically do not work. Instead, societal norms based on fiscal conservatism such as the Swiss referenda and political activism of the electorate play important roles. Ultimately capital markets and bond-rating agencies provide more effective discipline on fiscal policy. In this context, it is important not to backstop state and local debt and not to allow ownership of the banks by any level of government. Transparency of the budgetary process and institutions, accountability to the electorate, and general availability of comparative data encourages fiscal discipline.

A resurgence of recent interest in fiscal federalism has been a source of concern among macroeconomic stabilization experts. They argue that a decentralized fiscal system poses a threat to macroeconomic stability as it is incompatible with prudent monetary and fiscal management. The author addresses these concerns by taking a simple neo-institutional economics with an econometric analysis perspective. His analysis concludes that, contrary to a common misconception, fiscal decentralization is associated with improved fiscal performance and better functioning of internal common markets. Fiscal policy coordination represents an important challenge for federal systems. In this context, fiscal rules and institutions provide a useful framework but not necessarily a solution to this challenge. Fiscal rules binding on all levels can help sustain political commitment in countries having coalitions or fragmented regimes in power. Coordinating institutions help in the use of moral suasion to encourage a coordinated response. Industrial countries' experiences also show that unilaterally imposed federal controls and constraints on subnational governments typically do not work. Instead, societal norms based on fiscal conservatism such as the Swiss referenda and political activism of the electorate play important roles. Ultimately capital markets and bond-rating agencies provide more effective discipline on fiscal policy. In this context, it is important not to backstop state and local debt and not to allow ownership of the banks by any level of government. Transparency of the budgetary process and institutions, accountability to the electorate, and general availability of comparative data encourages fiscal discipline. Fiscal decentralization poses significant challenges for macroeconomic management. These challenges require careful design of monetary and fiscal institutions to overcome adverse incentives associated with the "common property" resource management problems or with rent seeking behavior. Experiences of federal countries indicate significant learning and adaptation of fiscal systems to create incentives compatible with fair play and to overcome incomplete contracts. This explains why that decentralized fiscal systems appear to do better than centralized fiscal systems on most aspects of monetary and fiscal policy management and transparent and accountable governance.