We provide empirical evidence to support the calibration of a limit on household indebtedness levels, in the form of a cap on the debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio, in order to reduce the probability of borrower defaults in Romania. The analysis establishes two findings that are new to the literature. First, we show that the relationship between DSTI and probability of default is non-linear, with probability of default responding to increases in DSTI only after a certain threshold. Second, we establish that consumer loan defaults occur at lower levels of DSTI compared to mortgages. Our results support the recent regulation adopted by the National Bank of Romania, limiting the household DSTI at origination to 40 percent for new mortgages and consumer loans. Our counterfactual analysis indicates that had the limit been in place for all the loans in our sample, the probability of default (PD) would have been lower by 23 percent.

The Greek financial system has remained resilient underpinned by strengthening banks’ balance sheets, but still faces significant challenges ahead including the re-emergence of imbalances in the real estate market. Recognizing these imbalances, the authorities have recently introduced the necessary legal framework for setting borrower-based measures (BBMs), paving the way to activate both income- and collateral-based measures in near term. Simulations, which employ a quantitative framework combining micro- and macro-level data, show that BBMs would help enhance household resilience, with synergies when caps on debt service-to-income (DSTI) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are jointly implemented, leading over time to the more resilient banking system against potential risks. Caps could initially be set at less binding levels and gradually tightened based on a systemic risk assessment.

We present a semi-structural model of default risk, which is a function of loan and borrower characteristics, economic conditions, and the regulatory environment. We use this model to simulate bank credit losses for stress-testing purposes and to calibrate borrower-based macroprudential tools. The proposed approach is very flexible and is particularly useful when there is limited history of crisis episodes, when crises bring unanticipated shocks where past tail events offer little guidance and when structural shocks or changes in financial regulations have altered the loan default process. We apply the model to quantify mortgage lending risk in two distinct mortgage markets. For each application, we show a range of modeling adjustments that can be made to capture country-specific institutional features. The model uses bank portfolio data broken down by risk bucket and vintage, which enables us to take explicit account of the loan life cycle and to incorporate the housing and economic cycles. This feature facilitates a timely assessment of banks' loss-absorbing capacity and the buildup of systemic risk conditional on policy. It also enables counterfactual analysis and the evaluation of macroprudential policy interventions.

The macroprudential policy framework in Spain has been significantly reinforced in recent years. A new macroprudential authority, Macroprudential Authority Financial Stability Council, (AMCESFI), has been established in Spain, to provide high level oversight and to strengthen internal coordination on the identification, prevention, and mitigation of systemic risks in the financial system. Techniques and approaches for systemic risk identification have been further enhanced. And gaps in the macroprudential policy toolkit identified by the previous FSAP have been closed, although to date the new tools have not been applied given the assessment of risks. The framework incorporates many areas of strength by international standards, such as the techniques for systemic risk identification and the breadth of permissible macroprudential tools.

The global financial crisis (GFC) underscored the need for additional policy tools to safeguard financial stability and ultimately macroeconomic stability. Systemic financial vulnerabilities had developed under a seemingly tranquil macroeconomic surface of low inflation and small output gaps. This challenged the precrisis view that achieving these traditional policy targets was a sufficient condition for macroeconomic stability. Thus, new tools had to be deployed to target specific financial vulnerabilities and to build buffers to cushion adverse aggregate shocks, while allowing traditional policy levers, including monetary and microprudential policies to focus on their traditional roles. Macroprudential policy measures emerged as the solution to this gap. Some of these measures had been used before the GFC (mostly in emerging markets). But it was only after the crisis that they were more widely adopted, and the toolkit expanded. This spurred a growing body of empirical research on the effects and potential shortfalls of these measures, with a further deepening of this knowledge gaining importance as policymakers confront increased financial stability risks in the post-pandemic world. Recognizing that there still is much to learn, this paper takes stock of our expanding understanding about the effects (and side effects) of macroprudential measures by focusing on these questions: What have we learned about the effects of macroprudential policy in containing the buildup of vulnerabilities? What do we know about the effects on economic activity and resilience? How do policy effects vary with conditions and over time? How important are leakages and circumvention? How do the effects on credit depend on other policies?

Germany’s macroprudential policy toolkit is well-developed, but its key missing piece is a set of instruments related to a borrower’s income. In addition, existing powers to adopt LTV limits have not yet been deployed. Against this background, this paper advances the discussion of borrower-based macroprudential policy in Germany by explaining how borrower-based measures could strengthen financial stability, macroeconomic stability, and consumer protection; explaining how potential concerns about these instruments could be addressed; offering approaches to initial calibrations of instruments for further analysis; and hinting at their likely effects based on other countries’ experiences. The paper also uses a microsimulation model to show that activating borrower-based measures could provide as much capital to the banking system as the capital buffer requirements that were activated in 2022.

This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries