This paper assesses the effects of fiscal consolidations associated with public debt reduction on medium-term output growth during periods of private debt deleveraging. The analysis covers 107 countries and 79 episodes of public debt reduction driven by discretionary fiscal adjustments during 1980–2012. It shows that expenditure-based, front-loaded fiscal adjustments can dampen growth when there are credit supply restrictions. Instead, fiscal adjustments that are gradual and rely on a mix of revenue and expenditure measures can support output expansion, while reducing public debt. In this context, protecting public investment is critical for medium-term growth, as is the implementation of supply-side, productivity-enhancing reforms.

task has become particularly challenging in European advanced economies where expectations of low growth and limits to monetary policy support are shifting the burden of adjustment onto fiscal consolidation. The SDN will investigate the main drivers behind successful past debt reversals, focusing on macroeconomic and financial market conditions, the speed and form of fiscal adjustment, and the institutional policy setting, among other things. Its policy conclusions will depend on the emerging stylized facts but are likely to include considerations on the design and pace of fiscal consolidation, taking into account country-specific as well as regional economic, institutional, and political factors.

Edited by Mario Monti, this volume contains the proceedings of a seminar that was held in Milan at the Centre for Financial and Monetary Economics, Universitá Luigi Bocconi. Participants included government officials, academicians, and economists; they provide a many-faceted view of fiscal policy at the domestic level and in the broader context of international policy coordination.

We revisit the empirical relationship between private/public debt and output, and build a model that reproduces it. In the model, the government provides financial assistance to credit-constrained agents to mitigate deleveraging. As we observe in the data, surges in private debt are potentially more damaging for the economy than surges in public debt. The model suggests two policy implications. First, capping leverage leads to milder recessions, but also implies more muted expansions. Second, with fiscal buffers, financial assistance to credit-constrained agents helps avoid stagnation. The growth returns from intervention decline as the government approaches the fiscal limit.

The pamphlet (which updates the 1995 Guidelines for Fiscal Adjustment) presents the IMF’s approach to fiscal adjustment, and focuses on the role that sound government finances play in promoting macroeconomic stability and growth. Structured around five practical questions—when to adjust, how to assess the fiscal position, what makes for successful adjustment, how to carry out adjustment, and which institutions can help—it covers topics such as tax policies, debt sustainability, fiscal responsibility laws, and transparency.

The Economics of Adjustment and Growth moves the study of macroeconomics for developing economies away from the traditional static approach and toward a more dynamic, growth-oriented framework. Pierre-Richard Agénor presents an analysis of policy issues involved in designing economic adjustment programs in developing countries and structural reform policies aimed at fostering economic growth. Emphasizing the need to take into account the structural features of these countries, his work dwells on the considerable body of analytical research and empirical evidence of the past two decades in academic circles and international organizations. It provides cutting-edge analysis of many current real-world issues, such as financial crises and the role of trade integration in fostering economic growth. Overall the book offers an impressive overview of the macroeconomic and structural adjustment issues facing developing economies today.

The initial government debt-to-GDP ratio and the government’s commitment play a pivotal role in determining the welfare-optimal speed of fiscal consolidation in the management of a debt crisis. Under commitment, for low or moderate initial government debt-to-GPD ratios, the optimal consolidation is very slow. A faster pace is optimal when the economy starts from a high level of public debt implying high sovereign risk premia, unless these are suppressed via a bailout by official creditors. Under discretion, the cost of not being able to commit is reflected into a quick consolidation of government debt. Simple monetary-fiscal rules with passive fiscal policy, designed for an environment with “normal shocks”, perform reasonably well in mimicking the Ramsey-optimal response to one-off government debt shocks. When the government can issue also long-term bonds–under commitment–the optimal debt consolidation pace is slower than in the case of short-term bonds only, and entails an increase in the ratio between long and short-term bonds.