The Oxford Handbook of French Politics provides a comprehensive and comparative overview of the French political system through the lens of political science. The Handbook is organized into three parts: the first part identifies foundational concepts for the French case, including chapters on republicanism and social welfare; the second part focuses on thematic large-scale processes, such identity, governance, and globalization; while the third part examines a wide range of issues relating to substantive politics and policy, among which are chapters on political representation, political culture, social movements, economic policy, gender policy, and defense and security policy. The volume brings together established and emerging scholars and seeks to examine the French political system from a comparative perspective. The contributors provide a state-of-the-art review both of the comparative scholarly literature and the study of the French case, making The Oxford Handbook of French Politics an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the foundations of contemporary political life in France.

This timely book explores the often stormy French-U.S. relationship and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1958D1969). The first work on this subject to draw on previously inaccessible material from U.S. and French archives, the study offers a comprehensive analysis of Gaullist policies toward NATO and the United States during the 1960s, a period that reached its apogee with de GaulleOs dramatic decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATOOs integrated military arm. This launched the French policy of autonomy within NATO, which has since been adapted without having been abandoned. De GaulleOs policy often has been caricatured by admirers and detractors alike as an expression of nationalism or anti-Americanism. Yet Frederic Bozo argues that although it did reflect the GeneralOs quest for grandeur, it also, and perhaps more important, stemmed from a genuine strategy designed to build an independent Europe and to help overcome the system of blocs. Indeed, the author contends, de GaulleOs actions forced NATO to adapt to new strategic realities. Retracing the different phases of de GaulleOs policies, Bozo provides valuable insight into current French approaches to foreign and security policy, including the recent attempt by President Chirac to redefine and normalize the France-NATO relationship. As the author shows, de GaulleOs legacy remains vigorous as France grapples with European integration, a new role within a reformed NATO, and relations with the United States.

Relying on internal sources, Wilfried Loth analyses the birth and subsequent development of the European Union, from the launch of the Council of Europe and the Schuman Declaration until the Euro crisis and the contested European presidential election of Jean-Claude Juncker. This book shines a light on the crises of the European integration, such as the failure of the European Defence Community, De Gaulle’s empty chair policy, or the rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, but also highlights the indubitable successes that are the Franco-German reconciliation, the establishment of the European common market, and the establishment of an expanding common currency. What this study accomplishes, for the first time, is to illuminate the driving forces behind the European integration process and how it changed European politics and society. “An enlightening work. Arequired reading for all who doubt the unfinished history of Europe.” – Rolf Steininger, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. “This book will become an indispensable standard work.” – Jörg Himmelreich, Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

The surprising story of how Algeria joined and then left the postwar European Economic Community and what its past inclusion means for extracontinental membership in today’s European Union. On their face, the mid-1950s negotiations over European integration were aimed at securing unity in order to prevent violent conflict and boost economies emerging from the disaster of World War II. But French diplomats had other motives, too. From Africa to Southeast Asia, France’s empire was unraveling. France insisted that Algeria—the crown jewel of the empire and home to a nationalist movement then pleading its case to the United Nations—be included in the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community. The French hoped that Algeria’s involvement in the EEC would quell colonial unrest and confirm international agreement that Algeria was indeed French. French authorities harnessed Algeria’s legal status as an official département within the empire to claim that European trade regulations and labor rights should traverse the Mediterranean. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany conceded in order to move forward with the treaty, and Algeria entered a rights regime that allowed free movement of labor and guaranteed security for the families of migrant workers. Even after independence in 1962, Algeria remained part of the community, although its ongoing inclusion was a matter of debate. Still, Algeria’s membership continued until 1976, when a formal treaty removed it from the European community. The Seventh Member State combats understandings of Europe’s “natural” borders by emphasizing the extracontinental contours of the early union. The unification vision was never spatially limited, suggesting that contemporary arguments for geographic boundaries excluding Turkey and areas of Eastern Europe from the European Union must be seen as ahistorical.

The creation of the European Union arguably ranks among the most extraordinary achievements in modern world politics. Observers disagree, however, about the reasons why European governments have chosen to co- ordinate core economic policies and surrender sovereign perogatives. This text analyzes the history of the region's movement toward economic and political union. Do these unifying steps demonstrate the pre-eminence of national security concerns, the power of federalist ideals, the skill of political entrepreneurs like Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors, or the triumph of technocratic planning? Moravcsik rejects such views. Economic interdependence has been, he maintains, the primary force compelling these democracies to move in this surprising direction. Politicians rationally pursued national economic advantage through the exploitation of asymmetrical interdependence and the manipulation of institutional commitments.