The Crisis That Rocked a Country and a Company... In April 2004, an illegally leaked U.S. Army report thrust CACI, an information technology company, into the international spotlight by casting suspicion on a CACI employee for being "either directly or indirectly responsible" for the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. At the same time, pictures from the abuses were shown on national television and tarnished anyone associated with Abu Ghraib--including CACI. What ensued was a media frenzy rarely seen by any company in recent decades. The media twisted the unsupported allegations into a guilty verdict without regard for the facts or the truth, creating a damning public perception of CACI. Our Good Name recounts how CACI battled to defend itself against erroneous and malicious reports by a rampaging media, how it responded to the wide-ranging government investigations, and how it overcame misplaced anger and criticism that put the company's dedicated employees and excellent reputation--even it's future--at risk. Our Good Name is CACI's story of facing one of the biggest scandals in recent history...and coming out honorably with its head high.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) aims to improve mission effectiveness and efficiency. In support of this effort, the Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center operated by the RAND Corporation, to construct a baseline of the DoD's government acquisition and procurement functions, including a functional decomposition and estimate of the cost of executing the government portion of the DoD's acquisition enterprise. NDRI researchers estimated these costs at between $29 billion and $38 billion in fiscal year 2017 dollars. To gain perspective on these costs, NDRI researchers identified commercial benchmarks for the amount of program management levels. As a percentage of DoD contracting obligations, NDRI researchers estimated the DoD's program management portion of these costs at about 1.5 percent in the last few years, which is below industry benchmarks of 2-15 percent.

The Department of the Army meets its materiel requirements principally through purchase from private sources. However, the Army produces certain ordnance-related items and performs some ordnance-related services in a set of arsenals, ammunition plants, other ammunition activities, and depots. The Army operates some of these facilities; contractors operate others. Although this set of facilities has been reduced since the end of the Cold War, the remaining facilities still operate at less than their full capacity today. The unused and underused capacity raises questions about how many of these facilities the Army needs, how large they need to be, and who should own and operate them. This report represents the third phase of a multiyear study that examines the Army's ordnance industrial base and makes recommendations about these issues.