"This monograph will prove to be one of the more valuable works ever written on the efficacy of modern era amphibious warfare. While many students of military affairs have assumed that large-scale forcible entry amphibious operations are a thing of the past, the authors have done an outstanding job, in just eight concise and well-written chapters, to demonstrate how amphibious warfare, in combination with other joint operations, can prove decisive on modern-day battlefields. Covering a little-known combat operation that incredibly involved two neighboring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies--Greece and Turkey--the 1974 battle known in Turkey as Operation Star Drop-4 and erroneously in the West as Operation Attila, took place on the perpetually restive island nation of Cyprus. Moreover, the authors have finally brought to light what is "arguably only one of two such [amphibious] operations" fought since 1945 that involved a substantially opposed landing. The operation also included the heavy use of airborne, airmobile, naval surface, and other follow-on armored forces that proved decisive toward relative Turkish success on Cyprus in 1974"--

Acknowledgements p. XI Introduction p. 1 Literature Review p. 4 1 The Centre of a Pre-Copernican Universe: A Very Short History of Cyprus p. 11 2 The Road to Disaster: Makarios and the Junta p. 15 3 Coup d'etat in Nicosia: The First 48 Hours p. 21 The Evacuation of Makarios p. 36 Contingency Plans and Delaying Tactics p. 39 4 Joint Intervention? p. 49 Kissinger's 'pet idea' - The Clerides Solution p. 56 Downing Street Meeting, 17 July 1974 p. 57 5 'Promoting a solution which will be in US interests', 18 July 1974 p. 65 6 Sisco in Athens and Ankara: Kissinger's Failure to Restrain the Turks, 19 July 1974 p. 75 Makarios at the Security Council p. 87 NATO's Attitude toward the Crisis p. 89 7 'A new ballgame': Turkey's First Military Operation p. 91 8 The First Two 'Ceasefires', 21 and 22 July 1974: The Road to the First Geneva Conference p. 105 The Sinking of the Kocatepe p. 111 Anglo-Turkish Confrontation at Kyrenia, 22 - 23 July 1974 p. 112 9 'A net gain for the West': Political Implications of the Turkish Military Operation p. 117 10 Further Anglo-Turkish Confrontation, 23-26 July 1974 p. 125 Confrontation at Nicosia Airport p. 126 11 Blockade of Northern Cyprus? The First Major Anglo-American Rift p. 133 12 The Danger for Turkish Cypriot Communities p. 139 13 First Geneva Conference, 25-30 July 1974 p. 147 The Eviction of the UN from Kyrenia - Britain Considers Military Intervention p. 162 The Final Phase at Geneva p. 165 14 Between the Talks, 1-12 August 1974 p. 171 15 Second Geneva Conference, 8-13 August 1974 p. 181 The Kissinger Solution - Cantonal Proposal p. 195 'There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus' - Final US Efforts to Save the Conference p. 210 The Final Showdown p. 213 16 Stopping the Turks? Final Debates on British/UNFICYP Military Intervention and a Greek Convoy p. 217 17 War, 14-16 August 1974 p. 225 Confrontation at Ayios Nikolaos, 15 August 1974 - The Last Possible Anglo-Turkish Showdown or the 'Trigger-Happy' Commander p. 230 Diplomatic Activities p. 231 The Final Day, 16 August 1974 p. 238 18 Big and Little Lies: Conspiracy Theories Gain Ground p. 241 Anglo-Turkish Collusion or Anglo-Greek Collusion? - The Evacuation of Officers from the British Bases p. 244 'If these attitudes continue we will wash our hands of the whole thing' - The Death of Roger Davies p. 246 19 Permitting Racial Separation: Attempts at Post-Crisis Management p. 249 A Present for Secretary Kissinger - Greek-Cypriot Territory as a Bargaining Chip p. 254 'A hard character with not much charity in his soul' - A Change in Turkish Attitude p. 256 Tyler's Mission to Athens - No Chance for a Solution p. 260 20 Refugees and War Crimes p. 265 Refugees on the British Bases p. 266 Population Exchange p. 272 Exchange of Prisoners p. 273 Missing Persons - and other War Crimes p. 274 21 Beyond the Crisis: Cyprus from Cold War to Annan p. 281 Conclusion: 'There is no nation of maniacs I don't get involved in': Henry Kissinger's Idiosyncratic Methods of Working p. 289 Annexes p. 299 Notes p. 305 Bibliography p. 353 Index p. 361.

"The book describes how the Greek fixation with Enosis--union with Greece--led to a one-sided war against the Turks and the brutal massacres of their men, women and children."--Provided by publisher.

Conventional wisdom and ideologies hold that responsibility for the partition of the Republic of Cyprus in the wake of Turkey’s multiple advances on the island in summer 1974 rests on domestic ethnic and religious tensions between the Turks and the Greeks. This book, drawing on a wealth of archival material, shows that this is not the case at all. As the detailed report of the United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza, had shown in 1965, the Turks and the Greeks living on the island could easily have co-existed if left alone to determine their future. This did not happen. The partition of the island had been inscribed in NATO’s policy since the 1950s, rewarding the strongest component of NATO’s southern flank, Turkey, at the expense of Greece, the weaker component. The volume details the role of CIA agents in Greece and the machinations of the Greek junta of Dimitrios Ioannides to overthrow the charismatic leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, who had been fighting for an independent and non-aligned Cyprus. It also explains how the partition of Cyprus in 1974 has opened up prospects for the partition of the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey, with Greece’s eastern Aegean islands becoming ‘NATOlands’ in the service of the war against Russia. The volume is an essential reading for researchers and students of the history and politics of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and south-eastern Europe.