The book has been authored by a highly regarded international legal scholar in commercial and private law. The book highlights how the legal landscape for in data protection, cross-border data flows and cybersecurity law is highly diverse and fragmented amongst all commonwealth countries. The book focuses on addressing the gaps in data, cybersecurity and national arbitration law of these countries. The aim of this book is to promote more engagement between commonwealth countries, to ensure they capitalise on the growing digital economy. Notwithstanding the above, the digital economy is rapidly changing the way we work and live. When coupled together cybersecurity and data law will be an important component of the future digital economy. They will both be integral to transnational trade and investment. That said, there will likely be disputes, and international arbitration can be an effective legal mechanism to resolve trade and investment disputes across the digital economy. On that basis, this book augments how the respective laws of commonwealth countries, along with the model data and cyber laws of the Commonwealth should be reviewed to minimise any legal divergence. This book provides a comparison and practical guide for academics, students, and the business community of the current day data protection laws and cross-border data flows among all commonwealth countries.

The use of computers and other technology introduces a range of risks to electoral integrity. Cybersecurity for Elections explains how cybersecurity issues can compromise traditional aspects of elections, explores how cybersecurity interacts with the broader electoral environment, and offers principles for managing cybersecurity risks.

Web-based connections permeate our lives - and so do data breaches. Given that we must be online for basic communication, finance, healthcare, and more, it is remarkable how many problems there are with cybersecurity. Despite the passage of many data security laws, data breaches are increasingat a record pace. In Breached!, Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, two of the world's leading experts on cybersecurity and privacy issues, argue that the law fails because, ironically, it focuses too much on the breach itself.Drawing insights from many fascinating stories about data breaches, Solove and Hartzog show how major breaches could have been prevented through inexpensive, non-cumbersome means. They also reveal why the current law is counterproductive. It pummels organizations that have suffered a breach, butdoesn't recognize other contributors to the breach. These outside actors include software companies that create vulnerable software, device companies that make insecure devices, government policymakers who write regulations that increase security risks, organizations that train people to engage inrisky behaviors, and more.The law's also ignores the role that good privacy practices can play. Although humans are the weakest link for data security, the law remains oblivious to the fact that policies and technologies are often designed with a poor understanding of human behavior. Breached! corrects this course byfocusing on the human side of security. This book sets out a holistic vision for data security law - one that holds all actors accountable, understands security broadly and in relationship to privacy, looks to prevention rather than reaction, and is designed with people in mind. The book closes witha roadmap for how we can reboot law and policy surrounding cybersecurity so that breaches become much rarer events.

This book discusses the legal and regulatory aspects of cybersecurity, examining the international, regional, and national regulatory responses to cybersecurity. The book particularly examines the response of the United Nations and several international organizations to cybersecurity. It provides an analysis of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, the Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime, the Draft International Convention to Enhance Protection from Cybercrime and Terrorism, and the Draft Code on Peace and Security in Cyberspace. The book further examines policy and regulatory responses to cybersecurity in the US, the UK, Singapore, India, China, and Russia. It also looks at the African Union's regulatory response to cybersecurity and renders an analysis of the Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a Credible Legal Framework for Cybersecurity in Africa. The book considers the development of cybersecurity initiatives by the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community, and the East African Community, and further provides an analysis of national responses to cybersecurity in South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria. It also examines efforts to develop policy and regulatory frameworks for cybersecurity in 16 other African countries (Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia Lesotho, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia). Nigeria is used as a case study to examine the peculiar causes of cyber-insecurity and the challenges that hinder the regulation of cybersecurity in African states, as well as the implications of poor cybersecurity governance on national security, economic development, international relations, human security, and human rights. The book suggests several policy and regulatory strategies to enhance cybersecurity in Africa and the global information society with emphasis on the collective responsibility of all states in preventing trans-boundary cyber harm and promoting global cybersecurity. It will be useful to policy makers, regulators, researchers, lawyers, IT professionals, law students, and any person interested in seeking a general understanding of cybersecurity governance in developed and developing countries.Ã?Â?Ã?Â?Ã?Â?Ã?Â?

In a world of increasing dependence on information technology, the prevention of cyberattacks on a nation's important computer and communications systems and networks is a problem that looms large. Given the demonstrated limitations of passive cybersecurity defense measures, it is natural to consider the possibility that deterrence might play a useful role in preventing cyberattacks against the United States and its vital interests. At the request of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Research Council undertook a two-phase project aimed to foster a broad, multidisciplinary examination of strategies for deterring cyberattacks on the United States and of the possible utility of these strategies for the U.S. government. The first phase produced a letter report providing basic information needed to understand the nature of the problem and to articulate important questions that can drive research regarding ways of more effectively preventing, discouraging, and inhibiting hostile activity against important U.S. information systems and networks. The second phase of the project entailed selecting appropriate experts to write papers on questions raised in the letter report. A number of experts, identified by the committee, were commissioned to write these papers under contract with the National Academy of Sciences. Commissioned papers were discussed at a public workshop held June 10-11, 2010, in Washington, D.C., and authors revised their papers after the workshop. Although the authors were selected and the papers reviewed and discussed by the committee, the individually authored papers do not reflect consensus views of the committee, and the reader should view these papers as offering points of departure that can stimulate further work on the topics discussed. The papers presented in this volume are published essentially as received from the authors, with some proofreading corrections made as limited time allowed.

Challenging the myth that the federal government exercises exclusive control over U.S. foreign-policymaking, Michael J. Glennon and Robert D. Sloane propose that we recognize the prominent role that states and cities now play in that realm. Foreign Affairs Federalism provides the first comprehensive study of the constitutional law and practice of federalism in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. It could hardly be timelier. States and cities recently have limited greenhouse gas emissions, declared nuclear free zones and sanctuaries for undocumented immigrants, established thousands of sister-city relationships, set up informal diplomatic offices abroad, and sanctioned oppressive foreign governments. Exploring the implications of these and other initiatives, this book argues that the national interest cannot be advanced internationally by Washington alone. Glennon and Sloane examine in detail the considerable foreign affairs powers retained by the states under the Constitution and question the need for Congress or the president to step in to provide "one voice" in foreign affairs. They present concrete, realistic ways that the courts can update antiquated federalism precepts and untangle interwoven strands of international law, federal law, and state law. The result is a lucid, incisive, and up-to-date analysis of the rules that empower-and limit-states and cities abroad.