This paper studies large reductions in current account deficits and exchange rate depreciations in low- and middle-income countries. It examines which factors help predict the occurrence of a reversal or a currency crisis, and how these events affect macroeconomic performance. Both domestic factors, such as the low reserves, and external factors, such as unfavorable terms of trade, are found to trigger reversals and currency crises. The two types of events are, however, distinct; an exchange rate crash is associated with a fall in output growth and a recovery thereafter, while for reversals there is no systematic evidence of a growth slowdown.

"Using panel data and case studies, we analyze the pre-1970 history of international capital flows and current account reversals. Considering a sample of emerging markets and advanced economies with per capita GDPs at least 60 per cent those of the lead country, we show that the incidence of reversals has been unusually great in recent years. The only prior period that matched the last three decades in terms of the frequency and magnitude of reversals was the 1920s and 1930s, decades notorious for the instability of capital flows. In contrast, reversals were both less common and smaller in the Bretton Woods and pre-World War I gold standard eras"--NBER website

This paper studies large reductions in current account deficits and exchange rate depreciations in low- and middle-income countries. It examines which factors help predict the occurrence of a reversal or a currency crisis, and how these events affect macroeconomic performance. Both domestic factors, such as the low reserves, and external factors, such as unfavorable terms of trade, are found to trigger reversals and currency crises. The two types of events are, however, distinct; an exchange rate crash is associated with a fall in output growth and a recovery thereafter, while for reversals there is no systematic evidence of a growth slowdown.

"In this paper I analyze the anatomy of current account adjustments in the world economy during the last three decades. The main findings may be summarized as follows: (a) Major reversals in current account deficits have tended to be associated to sudden stops' of capital inflows. (b) The probability of a country experiencing a reversal is captured by a small number of variables that include the (lagged) current account to GDP ratio, the external debt to GDP ratio, the level of international reserves, domestic credit creation, and debt services. (c) Current account reversals have had a negative effect on real growth that goes beyond their direct effect on investments. (d) There is persuasive evidence indicating that the negative effect of current account reversals on growth will depend on the country's degree of openness. More open countries will suffer less in terms of lower growth than countries with a lower degree of openness. (e) I was unable to find evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries with a higher degree of dollarization are more severely affected by current account reversals than countries with a lower degree of dollarization. And, (f) the empirical analysis suggests that countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes are able to accommodate the shocks stemming from a reversal better than countries with more rigid exchange rate regime"--NBER website

The current account deficit of the United States is more than six percent of its gross domestic product—an all-time high. And the rest of the world, including other G7 countries such as Japan and Germany, must collectively run current account surpluses to finance this deficit. How long can such unevenness between imports and exports be sustained, and what form might their eventual reconciliation take? Putting forth scenarios ranging from a gradual correction to a crash landing for the dollar, G7 Current Account Imbalances brings together economists from around the globe to consider the origins, status, and future of those disparities. An esteemed group of collaborators here examines the role of the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the history of previous episodes of current account adjustments, and the possibility of the Euro surpassing the dollar as the leading international reserve currency. Though there are areas of broad agreement—that the imbalances will ultimately decline and that currency revaluations will be part of the solution—many areas of contention remain regarding both the dangers of imbalances and the possible forms of adjustment. This volume will be of tremendous value to economists, politicians, and business leaders alike as they look to the future of the G7 economies.

The authors combine the literature on financial crises in emerging markets and developing economies with that on international migrations by investigating whether the increasingly large flows of workers' remittances can help reduce the probability of current account reversals. The rationale for this stands in the great stability and low cyclicality of remittances as compared with other private capital flows: these properties, combined with the fact that remittances are cheap inflows of foreign currencies, might reduce the probability that foreign investors suddenly flee out of emerging markets and developing economies and trigger a dramatic current account adjustment. The authors find that remittances can have such a beneficial effect. In particular, they show that a high level of remittances, as a ratio of GDP, makes the relationship between a decreasing stock of international reserves (over GDP) and a higher probability of current account crises less stringent. The same occurs, though less neatly, for the positive relationship between an increasing stock of external debt (over GDP) and the probability of current account reversals. The results point also to a threshold effect of remittances: the mechanisms just described are, in fact, much stronger when remittances are above 3 percent of GDP.