International investors poured vast sums of money into East Asian and Latin American countries during the mid-1990s, when the emerging market boom was at its peak. Then Thailand stumbled and panic seized the markets, and boom gave way to bust. Investors suffered large financial losses, while Asian countries suddenly experienced large capital outflows and the macroeconomic pressures these wrought plunged countries that had been growing rapidly ("miraculously") into crisis. Much the same had happened in Latin America when the debt crisis broke in 1982. This book investigates what can be done to make the international capital market a constructive force in promoting development in emerging markets. John Williamson concludes that the problem of cyclicality that has undermined the value of international borrowing cannot be tackled just, or even mainly, from the supply side, but will require actions on the part of both creditors and debtors.

Not employment or inflation as argued during the Great Depression and years of Reaganomics, the mechanism that drives the business cycle is proven to be the housing and property market in this analysis of the instability of financial markets. The consequences of how neoclassical economics ignores the importance of land are presented in a discussion of the dot-com crash. Agricultural, industrial, and commercial property and the housing market are examined to suggest that policymakers must revise their treatment of land in economic decisions to avoid the next economic crash, predicted for 2010.

The United States has once again entered into a period of large external imbalances. This study examines whether the large and growing currentaccount deficit is a problem, and if so, how problem can be solved.

Why has the economy of Latin America responded more positively than Asia, Europe or the United States after being hit by the recent global financial crisis? Three years after the worst of the crisis, Latin America's GDP is 25 percent higher than its precrisis level. José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile from 2007 to 2011, tells the story of how Latin America has responded to the crisis with a perspective that only an insider can have. De Gregorio focuses on the seven largest economies of the region, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela (90 percent of the region's output). He argues that Latin America was resilient because of good macroeconomic policies, strong financial systems, and "a bit of luck."