I examine the impact of cross-listing on firm-specific information utilizing the unique features of the Chinese capital markets. By separating the trading activity of domestic Chinese investors from that of foreign non-Chinese investors, this thesis is able to isolate each investor group's relative ability to impound firm-specific information into stock prices. I show that the cross-listed H-shares traded by foreign investors incorporate significantly more firm-specific information than their A-share counterparts traded by domestic Chinese investors. I find a similar pattern between H-shares and A-shares even after a 2007 regulatory change that allowed domestic Chinese investors to trade in the H-share market. This finding suggests that while institutional factors (e.g., stricter listing rules, stronger investor protection) can explain some of the benefits of cross-listing, foreign investors' ability to utilize firm-specific information plays a separate and distinct role in generating cross-listing benefits. The level of information improvement due to foreign investors depends on the quality of the cross-listed firm's corporate governance.

We examine the impact of cross-listing on firm-specific information utilizing the unique features of the Chinese capital markets. By separating the trading activity of domestic Chinese investors from that of foreign non-Chinese investors, we are able to isolate each investor group's relative ability to impound firm-specific information into stock prices. We show that the cross-listed H-shares traded by foreign investors incorporate significantly more firm-specific information than their A-share counterparts traded by domestic Chinese investors. We find a similar pattern between H-shares and A-shares even after a 2007 regulatory change that allowed domestic Chinese investors to trade in the H-share market. This finding suggests that while institutional factors (e.g., stricter listing rules, stronger investor protection) can explain some of the benefits of cross-listing, foreign investors' ability to utilize firm-specific information plays a separate and distinct role in generating cross-listing benefits. The level of information improvement due to foreign investors depends on the quality of the cross-listed firm's corporate governance.

This study investigates the economic consequences of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. We argue that by adopting a higher disclosure standard through cross-listing firms voluntarily commit themselves to reducing information asymmetry. As a result, cross-listed firms are able to benefit from growth opportunities with less appropriated cash flow and lower cost of capital. The empirical evidence shows that cross-listed firms indeed command higher valuations than their non-cross-listed counterparts, after controlling for certain firm-specific attributes. This lends support to the corporate governance hypothesis of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. The study also argues that an overall upgrading of accounting standards cannot substitute for the cross-listing mechanism.

This paper investigates the relation between cross listing in the U.S., with its resulting commitment to increased disclosure, and the information environment of non-U.S. firms. We find that firms that cross-list on U.S. exchanges have greater analyst coverage and increased forecast accuracy relative to firms that are not cross listed. A time-series analysis shows that the change in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy occurs around cross listing. We also document that firms that have more analyst coverage and higher forecast accuracy have a higher valuation. Further, the change in firm value around cross listing is correlated with changes in the firm's information environment. Our findings support the hypothesis that cross-listed firms have better information environments, which are associated with higher market valuations.

We examine whether managers of cross-listed firms improve corporate investment efficiency through learning from the stock market upon cross-listing. Using a sample of UK firms cross-listed on US regulated and unregulated stock markets, we find that cross-listed firms on unregulated markets invest more efficiently than non-cross-listed firms following cross-listing. Moreover, we find that cross-listed firms improve their investment efficiency post cross-listing. Furthermore, we find firms with low level of private information embedded in their stock prices, and firms with higher board independence improve their investment post cross-listing. Our findings suggest that managers of cross-listed firms are guided by firm-specific characteristic more than by stock market signals when they embark on new investment projects. We also find evidence that cross-listed firms on regulated exchanges perform poorly after cross-listing, whereas those cross-listed on unregulated exchange experience high performance post cross-listing.

We investigate whether cross-listing in the U.S. affects the information environment for non-U.S. stocks. Our findings suggest cross-listing has an asymmetric impact on stock price informativeness around the world, as measured by firm-specific stock return variation. Cross-listing improves price informativeness for developed market firms. For firms in emerging markets, however, cross-listing decreases price informativeness. We also find that price informativeness increases the most for firms in countries with the greatest investor protection. The added analyst coverage associated with cross-listing likely explains the findings in emerging markets, rather than changes in liquidity, ownership, or accounting quality. Our results indicate that the added analyst coverage fosters the production of marketwide information, rather than firm-specific information.

Essay from the year 2005 in the subject Business economics - Banking, Stock Exchanges, Insurance, Accounting, grade: very good (UK: grade A), University of Glasgow (Department of Accounting and Finance), course: International Financial Management, language: English, abstract: Some non-American companies benefit from a US-listing and others do not even cross-list in the US. Several empirical studies show that foreign companies, which are listed in the US, are worth more. However, less than one out of 10 large public non-American companies float their shares in the US (Doidge et al., 2004). Why is cross-listing beneficial to some companies and not to others? In 1997 more than 4,700 companies were internationally cross-listed. But, during the past several years this number decreased significantly by 50% to 2,300 (end of 2002) companies (Karolyi, 2004). Today more and more foreign companies acknowledge that they cannot cross-list in the US. Moreover, some companies admit that they are no longer even willing to cross-list, because of the high costs and strict requirements (Economist, 2005). Still, there must be a benefit for some to cross-list. A number of studies point out that the benefits regarding cross-listing include a lower cost of capital, access to foreign capital markets, an extended global shareholder base, greater liquidity in the trading of shares, publicity, visibility and prestige. On the other hand, these companies face costs, which might erode the benefits. Typical costs associated with a US-listing are the SECreporting, reconciliation of financial statements with home and foreign standards, direct listing costs, compliance requirements, exposure to legal liabilities, taxes and various trading frictions as well as investment banking fees (Karolyi, 2004 and Doidge et al., 2004). This essay aims to examine the empirical evidence regarding the merit of cross-listing shares on foreign equity markets, especially listing shares in the US. First, it critically reviews the conventional wisdom. Secondly, it examines the new approach of the cross-listing premium. Finally, it ends with a summary of this project and my own opinions.