Fiscal stimulus was widely advocated during the global crisis, a period characterized by monetary policy constrained by the effective lower bound (ELB) in many countries, in part because of expected positive spillovers. Standard New Keynesian models predict the cross-border transmission of fiscal shocks is stronger when monetary policy is constrained in recipients. However, the empirical evidence is scarce. This paper bridges this gap by looking at the impact of fiscal shocks in systemic (source) economies on output and demand components in a large group of (recipient) countries, under different monetary policy conditions. Empirical results are compared to simulations with a state-of-the-art estimated open-economy New Keynesian model. Our results corroborate model predictions, finding larger spillovers when recipients are at the ELB, driven by stronger responses of investment and consumption relative to normal times

Are fiscal spillovers today as large as they were during the global financial crisis? How do they depend on economic and policy conditions? This note informs the debate on the cross-border impact of fiscal policy on economic activity, shedding light on the magnitude and the factors affecting transmission, such as the fiscal instruments used, cyclical positions, monetary policy conditions, and exchange rate regimes. The note assesses spillovers from five major advanced economies (France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) on 55 advanced and emerging market economies that represent 85 percent of global output, looking at government-spending and tax revenue shocks during expansion and consolidation episodes. It finds that fiscal spillovers are economically significant in the presence of slack and/or accommodative monetary policy—and considerably smaller otherwise, which suggests that spillovers are large when domestic multipliers are also large. It also finds that spillovers from government-spending shocks are larger and more persistent than those from tax shocks and that transmission may be stronger among countries with fixed exchange rates. The evidence suggests that although spillovers from fiscal policies in the current environment may not be as large as they were during the crisis, they may still be important under certain economic circumstances.

This global handbook provides an up-to-date and comprehensive overview of shadow banking, or market-based finance as it has been recently coined. Engaging in financial intermediary services outside of normal regulatory parameters, the shadow banking sector was arguably a critical factor in causing the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This volume focuses specifically on shadow banking activities, risk, policy and regulatory issues. It evaluates the nexus between policy design and regulatory output around the world, paying attention to the concept of risk in all its dimensions—the legal, financial, market, economic and monetary perspectives. Particular attention is given to spillover risk, contagion risk and systemic risk and their positioning and relevance in shadow banking activities. Newly introduced and incoming policies are evaluated in detail, as well as how risk is managed, observed and assessed, and how new regulation can potentially create new sources of risk. Volume I concludes with analysis of what will and still needs to happen in the event of another crisis. Proposing innovative suggestions for improvement, including a novel Pigovian tax to tame financial and systemic risks, this handbook is a must-read for professionals and policy-makers within the banking sector, as well as those researching economics and finance.

Countries in the Middle East and North Africa are exposed to significant fiscal risks. This paper analyzes the sources of these fiscal risks in 17 low- and middle-income countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Pakistan region, excluding high-income Gulf countries (MENAPEG), and discusses avenues for reform to strengthen fiscal risk management. The materialization of fiscal risks in MENAPEG has been driven by macroeconomic shocks, contingent liabilities, and tail-risk events. The region has a track record of volatile economic growth and sharp exchange rate movements. High dependence on hydrocarbon revenue among MENAPEG oil and gas exporters and pervasive universal subsidies generate considerable budgetary exposure to swings in commodity prices. Substantial government involvement in the economy and large state ownership of firms and banks exposes several MENAPEG countries to contingent liabilities from state-owned enterprises and the financial sector. Lastly, the region’s history of social unrest and conflicts together with tail-risk events such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic, and natural disasters and climate change, have been important sources of fiscal risks. Many of the factors historically associated with the materialization of fiscal risks in MENAPEG countries are likely to remain sources of vulnerability in the future, raising the need for robust fiscal risk management frameworks. Policy reform can strengthen fiscal risk management in MENAPEG. This paper describes precedents where progress is made and provides a broad analytical framework for policymakers to build upon to fully embrace fiscal risk management in all its dimensions. Going forward, it is crucial for national authorities to enhance their capacity to identify, quantify, and assess risk factors and their budget’s exposure to them. This should be followed by thorough fiscal risk analysis to inform policy decisions to mitigate risks. Where risks cannot be mitigated or are judged to be acceptable, countries should consider adopting appropriate medium-term fiscal frameworks to build buffers to deal with them.

Central banks in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs) have been modernizing their monetary policy frameworks, often moving toward inflation targeting (IT). However, questions regarding the strength of monetary policy transmission from interest rates to inflation and output have often stalled progress. We conduct a novel empirical analysis using Jordà’s (2005) approach for 40 EMDEs to shed a light on monetary transmission in these countries. We find that interest rate hikes reduce output growth and inflation, once we explicitly account for the behavior of the exchange rate. Having a modern monetary policy framework—adopting IT and independent and transparent central banks—matters more for monetary transmission than financial development.

This paper sheds new light on the degree of international fiscal-financial spillovers by investigating the effect of domestic fiscal policies on cross-border bank lending. By estimating the dynamic response of U.S. cross-border bank lending towards the 45 recipient countries to exogenous domestic fiscal shocks (both measured by spending and revenue) between 1990Q1 and 2012Q4, we find that expansionary domestic fiscal shocks lead to a statistically significant increase in cross-border bank lending. The magnitude of the effect is also economically significant: the effect of 1 percent of GDP increase (decrease) in spending (revenue) is comparable to an exogenous decline in the federal funds rate. We also find that fiscal shocks tend to have larger effects during periods of recessions than expansions in the source country, and that the adverse effect of a fiscal consolidation is larger than the positive effect of the same size of a fiscal expansion. In contrast, we do not find systematic and statistically significant differences in the spillover effects across recipient countries depending on their exchange rate regime, although capital controls seem to play some moderating role. The extension of the analysis to a panel of 16 small open economies confirms the finding from the U.S. economy.

This paper seeks to advance our understanding of global financial interconnectedness by (i) mapping aspects of the architecture of global finance and (ii) investigating critical fault lines related to interconnectedness along which systemic risks were built up and shocks transmitted in the crisis. It thus takes initial steps toward operationalizing enhanced financial sector and macro-financial surveillance called for by the IMF’s Executive Board and by experts such as de Larosiere et al. (2009). Getting a better handle on interconnectedness would strengthen the Fund‘s ability, together with the Financial Stability Board, to track systemic risk concentrations. It would also inform spillover and vulnerability analyses, and sharpen bilateral and multilateral surveillance.