This book argues that the mainstream view and practice of critical thinking in education mirrors a reductive and reified conception of competences that ultimately leads to forms of epistemic injustice in assessment. It defends an alternative view of critical thinking as a competence that is normative in nature rather than reified and reductive. This book contends that critical thinking competence should be at the heart of learning how to learn, but that much depends on how we understand critical thinking. It defends an alternative view of critical thinking as a competence that is normative in nature rather than reified and reductive. The book draws from a conception of human reasoning and rationality that focuses on belief revision and is interwoven with a Bildung approach to teaching and learning: it emphasises the relevance of knowledge and experience in making inferences. The book is an enhanced, English version of the Italian monograph Epistemologia dell’Educazione: Pensiero Critico, Etica ed Epistemic Injustice.

In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.

"Centering Epistemic Injustice asks what it means for accounts of epistemic injustice to take seriously the lives and perspectives of socially marginalized knowers and the strategies that marginalized knowers use to circumvent persistent testimonial injustice"--

This book explores the epistemic side of racial and sexual oppression. It elucidates how social insensitivities and imposed silences prevent members of different groups from listening to each other.

This volume draws together cutting edge research from the social sciences to find ways of overcoming the unconscious prejusice that is present in our everyday decisions, a phenomenon coined by the philosopher Miranda Fricker as 'epistemic injustice'.

The book provides a thorough exploration of the epistemic dimensions of ignorance: what is ignorance and what are its varieties?

This book illustrates how feminist knowledge and postcolonial knowledge are marginalized in universities due to policies, organizational structures, and knowledge hierarchies that privilege metrics as measures of success and narrow views of science and research. The changing relationship between the state and knowledge production is a critical issue for universities and governments when disinformation is creating a crisis in expertise and trust in democratic institutions. Yet academic autonomy is being undermined by processes of corporatization of the university: managerialism, marketisation, technologization and privatization. Epistemic injustice occurs when particular knowledges are privileged due to policy priorities, metrics and organizational practices as these are underpinned by unequal power relations that inform who does what research and with whom. In turn, injustice occurs when knowledge is evaluated primarily on the basis of its usefulness. The chapters in this book illustrate the epistemic implications of changing institutional and organizational conditions produced by narrow conceptions of ‘knowledge’ and ‘good science’ and relations between them. It explores these arrangements at the level of colonial and geopolitical relations, and their effects in terms of institutional processes, practices, and agency. The text shows how a lack of epistemic diversity reinforces structural and cultural racial and gender injustices arising from colonialism, patriarchy, and dominant views of science. This volume will appeal to policy makers and researchers in higher education reform and scholars interested in changing academic practices from feminist and postcolonial perspectives. It was originally published as a special issue of Critical Studies in Education.