An integrated approach to the economics of sovereign default Fiscal crises and sovereign default repeatedly threaten the stability and growth of economies around the world. Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador provide a unified and tractable theoretical framework that elucidates the key economics behind sovereign debt markets, shedding light on the frictions and inefficiencies that prevent the smooth functioning of these markets, and proposing sensible approaches to sovereign debt management. The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default looks at the core friction unique to sovereign debt—the lack of strong legal enforcement—and goes on to examine additional frictions such as deadweight costs of default, vulnerability to runs, the incentive to “dilute” existing creditors, and sovereign debt’s distortion of investment and growth. The book uses the tractable framework to isolate how each additional friction affects the equilibrium outcome, and illustrates its counterpart using state-of-the-art computational modeling. The novel approach presented here contrasts the outcome of a constrained efficient allocation—one chosen to maximize the joint surplus of creditors and government—with the competitive equilibrium outcome. This allows for a clear analysis of the extent to which equilibrium prices efficiently guide the government’s debt and default decisions, and of what drives divergences with the efficient outcome. Providing an integrated approach to sovereign debt and default, this incisive and authoritative book is an ideal resource for researchers and graduate students interested in this important topic.

How creditors came to wield unprecedented power over heavily indebted countries—and the dangers this poses to democracy The European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. Why Not Default? unravels a striking puzzle at the heart of these debates—why, despite frequent crises and the immense costs of repayment, do so many heavily indebted countries continue to service their international debts? In this compelling and incisive book, Jerome Roos provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. He takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. He vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone—including the dramatic capitulation of Greece’s short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015. Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, Why Not Default? paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance. This important book shows how the profound transformation of the capitalist world economy over the past four decades has endowed private and official creditors with unprecedented structural power over heavily indebted borrowers, enabling them to impose painful austerity measures and enforce uninterrupted debt service during times of crisis—with devastating social consequences and far-reaching implications for democracy.

An empirical investigation of financial crises during the last 800 years.

The book presents and discusses policy-relevant research on the current debt challenges which developing, emerging market and developed countries face. Its value added lies in the integrated approach of drawing on theoretical research and evidence from practitioners' experience in developing and emerging market countries.

Debt, private and public, and in particular excessive debt, has been debated to be one of the root causes of economic crises. At the same time, economic crises are believed to lead to an increase of debt. This book, through a range of contributors, explores certain constituents of an economy and attempts to identify their contribution to debt (public and private), especially in times of crisis; namely, bonds, tariffs, social security and non-performing loans (NPLs). Furthermore, it captures the (implicit) impact of the demography on debt through tariffs and social security and investigates the effect of quantitative easing/purchase programs and as well as crises on debt. In addition, the (cost of the) reserve that a state may want to provision for, in order to secure its economy from defaulting within a certain time horizon, is also addressed and calculated. This calculation offers an alternative valuation, or pricing, of (excess) debt (default protection). This book aims to offer a comparative study of countries – especially those with a history of excessive debt - and intends to realize whether an economic crisis can genuinely deteriorate debt, or whether the debt unsustainability is preexisting to the crisis. It will be relevant to students and researchers interested in economic policy and growth.

Past cycles of sovereign lending and default suggest that debt crises will recur at some point. This book shows why investors should reckon with similar credit events in the future. Surveying the sovereign bond market, the author provides investors with a useful toolkit for analyzing sovereign bonds and foreseeing trends in the international financial architecture. The result should be a better understanding of debt crises and more deliberate investment decisions.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.