Through a theoretical and empirical examination of the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1966 NATO crisis, and the 2003 Iraq crisis, Eznack explores the connections between affect and emotion, the occurrence of crises, and the repair of those crises in close allies' relationships, and provides a new perspective on alliances and friendly relations among states.

The main objectives of this book are to analyse the risks and dangers NATO faces in the current strategic environment and to discuss how the alliance can readjust to those challenges. How can NATO adapt to the dangerous combination of a revisionist Russia, a reluctant United States, and a Europe in crisis? NATO’s relevance and ability to survive have been challenged many times before, and it has not only survived but also has proven highly adaptable to change. This has been good for Western cohesion and for the consolidation of the liberal-democratic, rules-based world order. The main argument of this book is that NATO can overcome this latest set of challenges as well and retain its central role as a cornerstone of the European and transatlantic security order. NATO is different from other alliances because its members share not only interests but values as well, codified in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty as allied support for democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The greatest enemy of the alliance is the forces that challenge the common norms and values of NATO’s member states, and – in a larger perspective – the liberal-democratic, rules-based world order, and Western civilisation itself. The book makes an original contribution to the existing literature on NATO and transatlantic relations and discusses the latest developments within NATO since the Trump administration took office. The book will be of much interest to students of NATO, geopolitics, security studies, and International Relations in general.

The past several years have seen strong disagreements between the U.S. government and many of its European allies, largely due to the deployment of NATO forces in Afghanistan and the commitment of national forces to the occupation of Iraq. News accounts of these challenges focus on isolated incidents and points of contention. The End of the West? addresses some basic questions: Are we witnessing a deepening transatlantic rift, with wide-ranging consequences for the future of world order? Or are today's foreign-policy disagreements the equivalent of dinner-table squabbles? What harm, if any, have recent events done to the enduring relationships between the U.S. government and its European counterparts? The contributors to this volume, whose backgrounds range from political science and history to economics, law, and sociology, examine the "deep structure" of an order that was first imposed by the Allies in 1945 and has been a central feature of world politics ever since. Creatively and insightfully blending theory and evidence, the chapters in The End of the West? examine core structural features of the transatlantic world to determine whether current disagreements are minor and transient or catastrophic and permanent.

The exploitation of superior US systems for the collection, analysis and distribution of information currently undermines US leadership in the context of transatlantic crisis management. The USA's clear lead in information technology creates political liabilities with respect to both allies and adversaries, while political-technical tradeoffs warrant a more open approach to information systems, information production, and information sharing among allies. Clearly distinguishing the role of information in winning wars versus managing crises, this book extends existing models for how breakdowns occur in international bargaining. Allies, who share preferences but not the resolve of a coalition leader, are brought into the explanation for war as a rational outcome of incomplete information. Case studies ranging from Cold War Berlin to the War in Iraq illustrate how national classified systems that underwrite large margins of victory in conventional combat fail to inspire trust among allies during the crucial, preceding stage of crisis bargaining. The volume offers powerful arguments for a new direction in defence transformation.

An authoritative examination of the continuing crisis in the Atlantic Alliance. Since the inception of NATO many have said that it would not last. Now, after 30 years of the NATO Alliance, this book discusses whether the present discord will actually bring about the dissolution of NATO, or whether it is simply the old situation in a new disguise. This book, based on a Symposium held in September 1983, outlines the military and economic crises, looks at the various solutions and, finally, focuses on the future of the Alliance.

Focusing on NATO's continued crisis of identity, Joyce P. Kaufman argues that the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo have proven to be critical to an alliance that has not been able to define its roles and missions in the post-Cold War world. While, on the one hand, NATO was enlarging by inviting former adversaries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to join, on the other hand it has been woefully unprepared to deal with the ethnic conflicts that erupted on its borders and that could undermine the peace and stability of Europe. The author contends that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have potentially threatened the essence of NATO by forcing the alliance to take on the new role of peacekeeper without adequately allowing the members to examine the role the alliance wants to or should play in a largely postcommunist world. Despite ongoing discussion in NATO ministerial summits, the alliance has made little progress to date and public questions about the role and even the viability of NATO after the Cold War continue to grow. The inability to address these issues leaves NATO facing a number of pressing questions that this book tries to answer: What role can and should the alliance play in the future? And why have the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans proven to be a challenge that the alliance has been unwilling or unable to resolve?