Investigates mechanisms in English and German law that protect creditors against the abuse of limited liability by directors and shareholders.

Creditor Rights and the Public Interest supports the greater representation of non-traditional creditors in the process of insolvency restructuring in Canada, concentrating particularly on restructuring under the federal Companies' Creditors' Arrangement Act (CCAA). Arguing in favour of the representation of such non-traditional creditors as workers, consumers, trade suppliers, and local governments, Janis Sarra describes the existing process of addressing their interests, analyzes four case studies that focus on non-creditor groups, and compares the Canadian approach to that of several other countries, such as Germany, France, and the United States. Sarra draws on a comprehensive body of academic literature that covers a broad range of issues--insolvency theory, corporate governance theory, legislative history, and bankruptcy and insolvency practice. She further surveys the relevant legislation and supplements her analysis with insights drawn from extensive primary research of court records and personal interviews with lawyers, judges, and government officials. Creditor Rights and the Public Interest ultimately illustrates the way in which the concept of the public interest can be utilized to foreground the concerns of non-traditional stakeholders. Sarra provides a coherent account of the justification for recognizing these creditors by situating insolvency law in a legal regime that realizes a duty to maximize all of the interests and investments at stake in the corporation. In an academic field where scholarship is currently scarce, Sarra's text will be a welcome contribution.

Private equity-backed leveraged buyout (LBO) and leveraged recapitalisation practices have been on the rise since the early 1970s when the LBO model was first invented. They continue to play a major role for investors for their less transparent and less bureaucratic investment models outside of capital markets, where financial regulations become tighter following the financial crisis of 2008 affecting global capital markets in a chain reaction. Private equity-backed LBOs and leveraged recapitalisations continue to be popular investment models, however they carry risks both at the target company level and on a macroeconomic level due to the interconnectedness of these investments with global capital markets for funding and refinancing of acquisition finance debts. Creditor protection mechanisms of company and insolvency law therefore play a central role in preventing or dealing with failures that may be triggered at the target company level and have detrimental effects for all creditors and the economy. Though the European legal capital system must be critically revisited, England's and Germany's already mature markets and legal systems should help in developing a better interpretation of these rules in developing economies like Turkey, consequently establishing a solid base for this investment practice in these economies.

The significant role of credit in obtaining corporate capital means that credit and the treatment of creditors’ interests raises distinctive issues in the event of company insolvency. In this book, Kayode Akintola addresses these issues, providing an exceptional in-depth analysis of the principles, policy and practice of creditor treatment in corporate insolvency law.

Corporate law and corporate governance have been at the forefront of regulatory activities across the world for several decades now, and are subject to increasing public attention following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance provides the global framework necessary to understand the aims and methods of legal research in this field. Written by leading scholars from around the world, the Handbook contains a rich variety of chapters that provide a comparative and functional overview of corporate governance. It opens with the central theoretical approaches and methodologies in corporate law scholarship in Part I, before examining core substantive topics in corporate law, including shareholder rights, takeovers and restructuring, and minority rights in Part II. Part III focuses on new challenges in the field, including conflicts between Western and Asian corporate governance environments, the rise of foreign ownership, and emerging markets. Enforcement issues are covered in Part IV, and Part V takes a broader approach, examining those areas of law and finance that are interwoven with corporate governance, including insolvency, taxation, and securities law as well as financial regulation. The Handbook is a comprehensive, interdisciplinary resource placing corporate law and governance in its wider context, and is essential reading for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers in the field.

This book adds to the debate on the effects of covenants on third-party creditors (externalities), which have recently become a focus of discussion in the contexts of bankruptcy law, corporate law and corporate governance. The general thrust of the debate is that negative effects on third-party creditors predominate because banks act in their own self-interest. After systematising the debated potential positive and negative externalities of covenants, the book empirically examines these externalities: It investigates the banks’ factual conduct and its effects on third-party creditors in Germany and the US. The study’s most significant outcome is that it disproves the assumption that banks disregard third-party creditors’ interests. These findings are then interpreted with the tools of economic analysis; particularly, with the concept of common pool resources (CPRs). Around the aggregated value of the debtor company’s asset pool (as CPR) exists an n-person prisoner’s dilemma between banks and third-party creditors: No creditor knows when and under what conditions the other creditor will appropriate funds from the debtor company’s asset pool. This coordination problem is traditionally addressed by means of bankruptcy law and collaterals. However, the incentive structure that surrounds the bilateral private governance system created by covenants and an event of default clause (a CPR private governance system) is found to also be capable of tackling this problem. Moreover, the interaction between the different regulation spheres – bankruptcy law, collateral and the CPR private governance system − has important implications for both the aforementioned discussions as well as the legal treatment of covenants and event of default clauses. Covenants alone cannot be seen as an alternative to institutional regulation; the complete CPR private governance system and its interaction with institutional regulation must also be taken into consideration. In addition, their function must first find more acceptance and respect in the legal treatment of covenants and event of default clauses: The CPR private governance system fills a gap in the regulation of the tragedy of the commons by bankruptcy law and collateral. This has particularly important implications for the German § 138 BGB, § 826 BGB and ad hoc duties to disclose insider information.