Europe’s banking system is weighed down by high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs), which are holding down credit growth and economic activity. This discussion note uses a new survey of European country authorities and banks to examine the structural obstacles that discourage banks from addressing their problem loans. A three pillared strategy is advocated to remedy the situation, comprising: (i) tightened supervisory policies, (ii) insolvency reforms, and (iii) the development of distressed debt markets.

According to a dynamic panel estimated over 1995 - 2008 on around 80 banks in the GCC region, the NPL ratio worsens as economic growth becomes lower and interest rates and risk aversion increase. Our model implies that the cumulative effect of macroeconomic shocks over a three year horizon is indeed large. Firm-specific factors related to risk-taking and efficiency are also related to future NPLs. The paper finally investigates the feedback effect of increasing NPLs on growth using a VAR model. According to the panel VAR, there could be a strong, albeit short-lived feedback effect from losses in banks’ balance sheets on economic activity, with a semi-elasticity of around 0.4.

Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System brings together the research of economists at New York University and the University of Maryland, along with those from the private sector, government bodies, and other universities. The first section of the volume focuses on the historical origins of the credit rating business and its present day industrial organization structure. The second section presents several empirical studies crafted largely around individual firm-level or bank-level data. These studies examine (a) the relationship between ratings and the default and recovery experience of corporate borrowers, (b) the comparability of credit ratings made by domestic and foreign rating agencies, and (c) the usefulness of financial market indicators for rating banks, among other topics. In the third section, the record of sovereign credit ratings in predicting financial crises and the reaction of financial markets to changes in credit ratings is examined. The final section of the volume emphasizes policy issues now facing regulators and credit rating agencies.

This report summarizes the findings of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Update for Spain. Although there is a core of strong banks that are well managed and appear resilient to further shocks, vulnerabilities remain. Substantial progress has been made in reforming the former savings banks, and the most vulnerable institutions have either been resolved or are being restructured. Recent measures address the most problematic part of banks’ portfolios. Moving ahead, a further restructuring and recapitalization of some of the remaining weaker banks may be needed as a result of deteriorating economic conditions.

Recent debate about the pro-cyclical effects of bank capital requirements, has ignored the important role that bank loan loss provisions play in the overall framework of minimum capital regulation. It is frequently observed that under-provisioning, due to inadequate assessment of expected credit losses, aggravates the negative effect of minimum capital requirements during recessions, because capital must absorb both expected, and unexpected losses. Moreover, when expected losses are properly reflected in lending rates, but not in provisioning practices, fluctuations in bank earnings magnify true oscillations in bank profitability. The relative agency problems faced by different stakeholders, may help explain the prevailing, and often unsatisfactory institutional arrangements. The authors test their hypotheses with a sample of 1,176 large commercial banks - 372 of them in non-G10 countries - for the period 1988-99. After controlling for different country-specific macroeconomic, and institutional features, they find robust evidence among G10 banks, of a positive association between loan loss provisions, and banks' pre-provision income. Such evidence is not confirmed for non-G10 banks, which on average, provision too little in good times, and are forced to increase provisions in bad times. The econometric evidence shows that the protection of outsiders' claims - the claims of minority shareholders in common law countries, and of fiscal authorities in countries with high public debt - on bank income, has negative effects on the level of bank provisions.