Nations with credible monetary regimes borrow at lower interest rates in international markets and are less likely to suffer speculative attacks and currency crises. While scholars typically attribute credibility to domestic institutions or international agreements, Jana Grittersová argues that when reputable multinational banks headquartered in Western Europe or North America open branches and subsidiaries within a nation, they enhance that nation’s monetary credibility. These banks enhance credibility by promoting financial transparency in the local system, improving the quality of banking regulation and supervision, and by serving as private lenders of last resort. Reputable multinational banks provide an enforcement mechanism for publicized economic policies, signaling to international financial markets that the host government is committed to low inflation and stable currency. Grittersová examines actual changes in government behavior of nations trying to gain legitimacy in international financial markets, and the ways in which perceptions of these nations change in relation to multinational banks. In addition to quantitative analysis of over 80 emerging-market countries, she offers extensive case studies of credibility building in the transition countries of Eastern Europe, Argentina in 2001, and the global financial crisis of 2008. Grittersová illuminates the complex interactions between multinational banks and national policymaking that characterize the process of financial globalization to reveal the importance of market confidence in a world of mobile capital.

A long-standing conjecture in macroeconomics is that recent declines in exchange rate pass-through are in part due to improved monetary policy performance. In a large sample of emerging and advanced economies, we find evidence of a strong link between exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices and the monetary policy regime’s performance in delivering price stability. Using input-output tables, we decompose exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices into a component that reflects the adjustment of imported goods at the border, and another that captures the response of all other prices. We find that price stability and central bank credibility have reduced the second component.

With the end of the Cold War, the International Monetary Fund emerged as the most powerful international institution in history. But how much influence can the IMF exert over fiercely contested issues in domestic politics that affect the lives of millions? In Lending Credibility, Randall Stone develops the first systematic approach to answering this question. Deploying an arsenal of methods from a range of social sciences rarely combined, he mounts a forceful challenge to conventional wisdom. Focusing on the former Soviet bloc, Stone finds that the IMF is neither as powerful as some critics fear, nor as weak as others believe, but that the answer hinges on the complex factor of how much credibility it can muster from country to country. Stone begins by building a formal, game-theoretic model of lending credibility, which he then subjects to sophisticated quantitative testing on original data from twenty-six countries over the 1990s. Next come detailed, interview-based case studies on negotiations between the IMF and Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and Bulgaria. Stone asserts that the IMF has exerted startling influence over economic policy in smaller countries, such as Poland and Bulgaria. However, where U.S. foreign policy interests come more heavily into play, as in Russia, the IMF cannot credibly commit to enforcing the loans-for-policy contract. This erodes its ability to facilitate enduring market reforms. Stone's context is the postcommunist transition in Europe and Asia, but his findings carry implications for IMF activities the world over.

This book presents ten studies which combine historical narrative with econometrics to analyze the role of credibility in four monetary regimes.

In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies.

The next financial collapse will resemble nothing in history. . . . Deciding upon the best course to follow will require comprehending a minefield of risks, while poised at a crossroads, pondering the death of the dollar. The U.S. dollar has been the global reserve currency since the end of World War II. If the dollar fails, the entire international monetary system will fail with it. But optimists have always said, in essence, that confidence in the dollar will never truly be shaken, no matter how high our national debt or how dysfunctional our government. In the last few years, however, the risks have become too big to ignore. While Washington is gridlocked, our biggest rivals—China, Russia, and the oil-producing nations of the Middle East—are doing everything possible to end U.S. monetary hegemony. The potential results: Financial warfare. Deflation. Hyperinflation. Market collapse. Chaos. James Rickards, the acclaimed author of Currency Wars, shows why money itself is now at risk and what we can all do to protect ourselves. He explains the power of converting unreliable investments into real wealth: gold, land, fine art, and other long-term stores of value.

This book discusses the role of central banks and draws lessons from examining their evolution over the past two centuries.