Creating the 'Big Mess' and its sequel Accounting for Crises use Marx's theory of capitalism to explain why there is no generally accepted theory of financial accounting, and explore the consequences, by studying the history of American accounting theory from c.1900 to 2007. The answer, Creating the 'Big Mess', is first that while late-19th century British accounting principles, founded on the going-concern concept, provided an objective basis for holding management accountable to shareholders for its stewardship of capital, and were accepted by the nascent American profession, they are inchoate. Second, Irving Fisher's economic theory of accounting, based on the assertion that present value is the accountants' measurement ideal, which is subjective, framed early-20th century American accounting theory, which undermined British principles, making them incoherent. In an unregulated, pro-business environment, leading theorists, particularly Henry Rand Hatfield and William A. Paton, Jr., became authorities for management discretion, creating the 'big mess' Hatfield saw in late-1920s American accounting. Accounting for Crises examines the roles of Fisher's theory in promoting the speculation leading to the 1929 Great Crash, aggravating the Great Depression, hindering accounting regulation from the 1930s, producing the Financial Accounting Standard Board's conceptual framework, and facilitating the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis.

Historians have not convincingly explained modern capitalism's two major economic crises, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009. Accounting for Crises offers a new explanation, why both began and were more severe in the USA ('America'), based on an accounting interpretation of Marx's theory of crises. It explains their origins in capitalists' control of accumulation, which reveals important overlooked roles for Irving Fisher's accounting theory. This theory, by allowing discretion in accounts, in the context of falling rates of profit, encouraged 'swindling', overstating reported profits, and understating their risk, which facilitated and aggravated both crises. Framed by Fisher's theory, during the 1920s American accounting theorists justified discretion, which Creating the 'Big Mess' (the companion volume) concluded it management used to conservatively smooth earnings. Accounting for Crises shows that Fisher's theory , also underlays the popular new theory of investment that justified valuing shares using reported earnings, which encouraged their manipulation and legitimized 'speculation'. This, it argues, underlays America's exceptional late-1920s stock market boom, the 1929 Great Crash, and the depth and length of its Great Depression. Prominently associated with the boom, Fisher became unpopular after the crash, his name disappearing from public debate. Nevertheless, the book concludes, his theory hindered economic recovery, weakened 1930s reforms, undermined accounting regulation from the late-1930s, and following his rehabilitation from the late-1950s, underlies the Financial Accounting Standards Board's conceptual framework, which by allowing off-balance-sheet accounting for securitization-SPEs, fostered the 2007 'credit crunch' that triggered the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC).

This book addresses the divide that exists between the reality of finance and the image it projects. A functioning financial system is an essential feature of a modern economy, providing it with money, credit, capital, and investments. Conversely, those who provide this essential service are neither respected nor trusted. The causes and consequences of this divide is explored using the British experience from 1800 to the present, drawing upon a mixture of factual evidence and contemporary fiction. Nothing of this scale has been attempted before and this is the product of 50 years of research.

What is fascism? By focusing on the concrete: what the fascists did, rather than what they said, the esteemed historian Robert O. Paxton answers this question. From the first violent uniformed bands beating up “enemies of the state,” through Mussolini’s rise to power, to Germany’s fascist radicalization in World War II, Paxton shows clearly why fascists came to power in some countries and not others, and explores whether fascism could exist outside the early-twentieth-century European setting in which it emerged. "A deeply intelligent and very readable book. . . . Historical analysis at its best." –The Economist The Anatomy of Fascism will have a lasting impact on our understanding of modern European history, just as Paxton’s classic Vichy France redefined our vision of World War II. Based on a lifetime of research, this compelling and important book transforms our knowledge of fascism–“the major political innovation of the twentieth century, and the source of much of its pain.”

War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-eight eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressing divergent claims to justice and controlling news from the front in order to sustain moral and influence international opinion. Part II looks at politics from the perspective of pre-war and wartime diplomacy as well as examining the way in which neutrals were treated and behaved. The volume concludes by assessing the impact of states, politics and ideology on the fate of individuals as occupied and liberated peoples, collaborators and resistors, and as British and French colonial subjects.

An innovative account of how thousands of acts of parliament sought to improve economic activity during the early industrial revolution.

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