For about three decades until the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Covered Interest Parity (CIP) appeared to hold quite closely—even as a broad macroeconomic relationship applying to daily or weekly data. Not only have CIP deviations significantly increased since the GFC, but potential macrofinancial drivers of the variation in CIP deviations have also become significant. The variation in CIP deviations seems to be associated with multiple factors, not only regulatory changes. Most of these do not display a uniform importance across currency pairs and time, and some are associated with possible temporary considerations (such as asynchronous monetary policy cycles).

Asian countries have high demand for U.S. dollars and are sensitive to U.S. dollar funding costs. An important, but often overlooked, component of these costs is the basis spread in the cross-currency swap market that emerges when there are deviations from covered interest parity (CIP). CIP deviations mean that investors need to pay a premium to borrow U.S. dollars or other currencies on a hedged basis via cross-currency swap markets. These deviations can be explained by regulatory changes since the global financial crisis, which have limited arbitrage opportunities and country-specific factors that contribute to a mismatch in the demand and supply of U.S. dollars. We find that an increase in the basis spread tightens financial conditions in net debtor countries, while easing financial conditions in net creditor countries. The main reason is that net debtor countries are, in general, unable to substitute smoothly to other domestic funding channels. Policies that promote reliable alternative funding sources, such as long-term corporate bond market or stable long-term investors, including a “hedging counterpart of last resort,” can help stabilize financial intermediation when U.S. dollar funding markets come under stress.

The literature on the drivers of capital flows stresses the prominent role of global financial factors. Recent empirical work, however, highlights how this role varies across countries and time, and this heterogeneity is not well understood. We revisit this question by focusing on financial intermediaries’ funding flows in different currencies. A concise portfolio model shows that the sign and magnitude of the response of foreign currency funding flows to global risk factors depend on the financial intermediary’s pre-existing currency exposure. An analysis of a rich dataset of European banks’ aggregate balance sheets lends support to the model predictions, especially in countries outside the euro area.

We provide a systematic empirical treatment of short-term Covered Interest Parity (CIP) deviations for a large set of emerging market (EM) currencies. EM CIP deviations have much larger volatilities than most G10 currencies and move in an opposite direction during global risk-off episodes. While off-shore EM CIP deviations are sensitive to changes in FX dealers’ risk-bearing capacities and global risk aversion, on-shore EM CIP deviations are largely unresponsive in segmented FX markets. Moreover, the sensitivity of offshore EM CIP deviations to global risk factors for currencies with segmented FX markets is stronger compared to their counterparts with integrated FX markets. We find weak evidence of country default risk affecting EM CIP deviations after accounting for global factors.

This paper examines how exchange rate volatility and Korean banks’ foreign exchange liquidity mismatches interacted with each other during the Global Financial Crisis, and whether the vulnerability stemming from this interaction has been reduced since then. Structural and cyclical changes after the crisis, including decreasing demand for currency hedges and the diversifying investor base for bonds, point to a possible weakening of the interaction mechanism; and we find evidences are strongly supportive of this.

The October 2019 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) identifies the current key vulnerabilities in the global financial system as the rise in corporate debt burdens, increasing holdings of riskier and more illiquid assets by institutional investors, and growing reliance on external borrowing by emerging and frontier market economies. The report proposes that policymakers mitigate these risks through stricter supervisory and macroprudential oversight of firms, strengthened oversight and disclosure for institutional investors, and the implementation of prudent sovereign debt management practices and frameworks for emerging and frontier market economies.