The CIA and the Assassination of John Kennedy

Acetate overlay in pocket.Includes index. Bibliography: p. 307-308.

E. Howard Hunt, who sued this author for writing about his involvement in the JFK assassination or "The Big Event" confessed to being part of the crew and named Frank Fiorini Sturgis as one of principals; Coup D'Etat in America was the book that inspired Congressman Henry Gonzalez to introduce a bill in Congress that led to the formation of House Select Committee on Assassinations. This is a longer updated version. It is based on the theory that the three tramps who were picked up about an hour after the Kennedy Assassination (not to be confused with the three real bums who were picked up right after the big event - Oliver Buck Revell of FBI Dallas FO floated this story to discredit the tramp theory) were E. Howard Hunt, CIA official who was instrumental in the overthrow of Arbenz of Guatemala and was deeply involved in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Frank Fiorini Sturgis, a leader of Operation 40 which involved assassinating all the Communists and their families in Cuba after Castro was deposed, and David Lemar Christ, who was locked up and tortured by Castro for bugging the ChiCom wire service and released in April 1963 in a prisoner exchange. It also documents the part that James Angleton played in Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union and Oswald's role in sabotaging an upcoming USSR USA Summit conference. Coup is based on years and years of research at NARA, Federal Court houses, personal interviews and the information I bought from Gerry Patrick Hemming, the man who brought Oswald into the mix and had him believing that he was running a counter-intelligence operation against the Cubans by trying to visit Cuba, by forming the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and other of Oswald's shenanigans. Hemming offered Oswald twice the cost of his rifle and told him to bring it to the TSBD on November 22, 1963. Oswald didn't have a clue that the big event was going down. Hemming tried to set me up for a fall to work off a beef. He said he knew of a lab where the Yippies could construct an atomic IED. Just taking a step in that direction is conspiracy. I told him my name was no Oswald. Coup also documents Jack Ruby's part in the conspiracy as the CIA and the Mafia had worked together to assassinate Fidel Castro. But Jack's flunkie Tippet messed up because Oswald had realized he was a patsy in the big event by this time and took Tippet out before Tippet could take him out as Ruby had ordered. Oswald had heard Hemming talk about scenarios where patsy's get blown away and suddenly realize that his old Marine buddy had set him up. This book in constantly being updated.

A stroke of the pen and history is changed. In 1938, British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, determined to avoid war, signed the Munich Accord, ceding part of Czechoslovakia to Hitler. But the following spring, Hitler snatched the rest of that country, and England, after a fatal act of appeasement, was fighting a war for which it was not prepared. Now, in this thrilling alternate history, another scenario is played out: What if Chamberlain had not signed the accord? In this action-packed chronicle of the war that might have been, Harry Turtledove uses dozens of points of view to tell the story: from American marines serving in Japanese-occupied China and ragtag volunteers fighting in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion in Spain to an American woman desperately trying to escape Nazi-occupied territory—and witnessing the war from within the belly of the beast. A tale of powerful leaders and ordinary people, at once brilliantly imaginative and hugely entertaining, Hitler’s War captures the beginning of a very different World War II—with a very different fate for our world today. BONUS: This edition contains an excerpt from Harry Turtledove's The War that Came Early: West and East.

The Democratic Coup d'État advances a simple, yet controversial, argument: democracy sometimes comes through a military coup. Covering coups that toppled dictators and installed democratic rule in countries as diverse as Guinea-Bissau, Portugal, and Colombia, the book weaves a balanced narrative that challenges everything we knew about military coups.

“For readers interested in international relations, politics, and global issues.” -Library Journal, Starred Review The Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups d’état surveys the history of coups d’état in the post-World War II period. The term “modern” in the title therefore demarcates the period since January 1946. This book documents over 582 coup attempts that have occurred in 108 different countries worldwide over a period of 75 years. Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups d'état contains a chronology, an introduction, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has more than 1,400 cross-referenced dictionary entries. This book is an excellent resource for students, and researchers.

In this lively and provocative book, Erica De Bruin looks at the threats that rulers face from their own armed forces. Can they make their regimes impervious to coups? How to Prevent Coups d'État shows that how leaders organize their coercive institutions has a profound effect on the survival of their regimes. When rulers use presidential guards, militarized police, and militia to counterbalance the regular military, efforts to oust them from power via coups d'état are less likely to succeed. Even as counterbalancing helps to prevent successful interventions, however, the resentment that it generates within the regular military can provoke new coup attempts. And because counterbalancing changes how soldiers and police perceive the costs and benefits of a successful overthrow, it can create incentives for protracted fighting that result in the escalation of a coup into full-blown civil war. Drawing on an original dataset of state security forces in 110 countries over a span of fifty years, as well as case studies of coup attempts in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, De Bruin sheds light on how counterbalancing affects regime survival. Understanding the dynamics of counterbalancing, she shows, can help analysts predict when coups will occur, whether they will succeed, and how violent they are likely to be. The arguments and evidence in this book suggest that while counterbalancing may prevent successful coups, it is a risky strategy to pursue—and one that may weaken regimes in the long term.