This publication, “Counterinsurgency Operations (Joint Publication 3-24),” provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations across the range of military operations. This will include the description of relationships between COIN, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense. The twenty-first century is typified by a volatile international environment, persistent conflict, and increasing state fragility. Long-standing external and internal tensions tend to exacerbate or create core grievances within some states, resulting in political strife, instability, or even insurgency. Moreover, some transnational terrorists/extremists with radical political and religious ideologies may intrude in weak or poorly governed states to form a wider, more networked threat. Insurgency is an internal threat that uses subversion and violence to reach political ends. Conversely, counterinsurgents seek to defeat insurgents and address core grievances to prevent insurgency's expansion or regeneration. Typically the insurgents will solicit or be offered some type of support from state or non-state actors, which can include transnational terrorists who take advantage of the situation for their own benefit. Affected nations may request United States support in countering an insurgency, which is typically the circumstances under which US forces become involved in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is only one. Unified action is required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should include all host nation (HN), US, and multinational agencies or actors. Civilian agencies should lead COIN efforts. When operational conditions do not permit a civilian agency to lead COIN within a specific area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant of the unified action required for effective COIN. In traditional warfare the conflict focuses on defeating the opposing military through force-on-force engagements, and influencing the government by taking control of their territory, and influencing the people generally through intimidation, fear, and deception; whereas in irregular warfare (IW), the conflict focuses more on the control or influence over, and the support of, a relevant population and not on the control of an adversary's forces or territory. Some military operations, such as foreign internal defense (FID), COIN, combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare (UW) are primarily conducted during IW. COIN requires joint forces to both fight and build sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. COIN requires joint forces to both fight and build sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. The balance of these operations must be appropriate to accomplish the current phase's objectives. Offensive and defensive operations in COIN that are predominantly aimed at insurgent combatants are counterguerrilla operations. Stability operations are consequently fundamental to COIN—stability operations address the core grievances of insurgency as well as drivers of conflict and are therefore essential to long-term success. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.

1. ScopeThis publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations across the range of military operations. This will include the description of relationships between COIN, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense. 2. Purpose:This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 3. Application: a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations across the range of military operations. This will include the description of relationships between COIN, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

This manual, Joint Publication JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency 25 April 2018, provides joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess counterinsurgency operations. Specifically it discusses approaches to counterinsurgency, describes the nature of an insurgency, discusses the tenets of counterinsurgency, provides considerations for counterinsurgency planning, describes the counterinsurgency operational environment, and discusses aspects for the conduct of an assessment. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

Insurgency uses a mixture of subversion, sabotage, political, economic, psychological actions, and armed conflict to achieve its political aims. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, a military occupation government, an interim civil administration, ora peace process while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy-the central issues in an insurgency.Counterinsurgency (COIN) is primarily a political struggle and incorporates a wide range of activities by the host nation (HN) government of which security is only one, albeit an important one. The HN government in coordination with the chief of mission (COM) should lead the COIN efforts. When the operational environment (OE)is not conducive to a civilian agency lead for the COIN effort within a specific area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant of and able to lead the unified action required for effective COIN.

This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.

Original 2006 Publication. This field manual/Marine Corps warfighting publication establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for mili- tary operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous coun- terinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and na- tional security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies-some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. The manual begins with a description of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The first chapter includes a set of principles and imperatives necessary for successful COIN operations. Chapter 2 discusses nonmilitary or- ganizations commonly involved in COIN operations and principles for integrating military and civilian activi- ties. Chapter 3 addresses aspects of intelligence specific to COIN operations. The next two chapters discuss the design and execution of those operations. Developing host-nation security forces, an essential aspect of suc- cessful COIN operations, is the subject of chapter 6. Leadership and ethical concerns are addressed in chapter 7. Chapter 8, which concerns sustainment of COIN operations, concludes the basic manual. The appendixes contain useful supplemental information. Appendix A discusses factors to consider during the planning, prepa- ration, execution, and assessment of a COIN operation. Appendixes B and C contain supplemental intelligence information. Appendix D addresses legal concerns. Appendix E describes the role of airpower. Doctrine by definition is broad in scope and involves principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable worldwide. Thus, this publication is not focused on any region or country and is not intended to be a stand- alone reference. Users should assess information from other sources to help them decide how to apply the doc- trine in this publication to the specific circumstances facing them. The primary audience for this manual is leaders and planners at the battalion level and above. This manual ap- plies to the United States Marine Corps, the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.