The American way of war includes mass, power, and the use of sophisticated smart weapons.However, large main force engagements that characterized conflict in World War II, Korea, andOperations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East have become the exceptions inAmerican warfare. Since the American Revolution, the Army has conducted stability operations, which have included counterinsurgency operations. Over the past half-century alone, the Armygained considerable experience in fighting insurgents in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Philippines), Latin America (Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua), Africa (Somalia), Southwest Asia (Afghanistan), and now the Middle East (Iraq). Dealing with counterinsurgencysince the Vietnam War has fallen largely on SOF; however, conventional forces have frequentlycome into contact with insurgent forces that seek to neutralize the inherent advantages of size, weaponry, and conventional force TTP. Insurgents use a combination of actions that include terror, assassination, kidnapping, murder, guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices aimed at US and multinational forces, the host country's leaders, andordinary citizens. Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civicactions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). It is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power; it can take place across the range of operations and spectrumof conflict. It supports and influences an HN's IDAD program. It includes strategic and operational planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel, technical, and organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; tactical-level operations; and many elements of PSYOP. Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs. Leaders must consider the roles of military, intelligence, diplomatic, lawenforcement, information, finance, and economic elements (MIDLIFE) in counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). It is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power; it can take place across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict. It supports and influences an HN’s IDAD program. It includes strategic and operational planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel, technical, and organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; tactical-level operations; and many elements of PSYOP. Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs. Leaders must consider the roles of military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance, and economic elements (MIDLIFE) in counterinsurgency.

This field manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) fortactical counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at the company, battalion, andbrigade level. It isbased on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today's operational environment (OE)-an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other doctrinal sources. - Chapter 1, Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency, defines insurgent and counterinsurgent while using the operational variables and mission variables to describe the OE. Finally, it stresses developing a culture capability for Soldiers and leaders. - Chapter 2, Foundations of Insurgency, categorizes insurgent groups by their components- elements, dynamics, and strategies and their manifestations-tactics, strengths, and vulnerabilities. - Chapter 3, Foundations of Counterinsurgency, covers the seven lines ofeffort, tactical considerations, clear-hold-build operations, and counterinsurgency phases. - Chapter 4, Planning in Counterinsurgency, arguably the most important chapter, covers planning fortactical units during counterinsurgency operations. It also covers planning horizons and targeting. - Chapter 5, Offensive Operations in Counterinsurgency, addresses offensive techniques used by tactical units during counterinsurgency operations. - Chapter 6, Defensive Operations in Counterinsurgency, addresses defensive techniques used by tactical units during counterinsurgency operations. - Chapter 7, Stability Operations in Counterinsurgency, addresses stability techniques used by tactical units during counterinsurgency operations. - Chapter 8, Working with Host Nation Security Forces, covers the seven steps (MORTEAM) units use to train, advise, and partner with Host Nation security forces.

Original 2006 Publication. This field manual/Marine Corps warfighting publication establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for mili- tary operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous coun- terinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and na- tional security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies-some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. The manual begins with a description of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The first chapter includes a set of principles and imperatives necessary for successful COIN operations. Chapter 2 discusses nonmilitary or- ganizations commonly involved in COIN operations and principles for integrating military and civilian activi- ties. Chapter 3 addresses aspects of intelligence specific to COIN operations. The next two chapters discuss the design and execution of those operations. Developing host-nation security forces, an essential aspect of suc- cessful COIN operations, is the subject of chapter 6. Leadership and ethical concerns are addressed in chapter 7. Chapter 8, which concerns sustainment of COIN operations, concludes the basic manual. The appendixes contain useful supplemental information. Appendix A discusses factors to consider during the planning, prepa- ration, execution, and assessment of a COIN operation. Appendixes B and C contain supplemental intelligence information. Appendix D addresses legal concerns. Appendix E describes the role of airpower. Doctrine by definition is broad in scope and involves principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable worldwide. Thus, this publication is not focused on any region or country and is not intended to be a stand- alone reference. Users should assess information from other sources to help them decide how to apply the doc- trine in this publication to the specific circumstances facing them. The primary audience for this manual is leaders and planners at the battalion level and above. This manual ap- plies to the United States Marine Corps, the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

This field manual/Marine Corps warfighting publication establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies-some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. The manual begins with a description of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The first chapter includes a set of principles and imperatives necessary for successful COIN operations. Chapter 2 discusses nonmilitary organizations commonly involved in COIN operations and principles for integrating military and civilian activities. Chapter 3 addresses aspects of intelligence specific to COIN operations. The next two chapters discuss the design and execution of those operations. Developing host-nation security forces, an essential aspect of successful COIN operations, is the subject of chapter 6. Leadership and ethical concerns are addressed in chapter 7. Chapter 8, which concerns sustainment of COIN operations, concludes the basic manual. The appendixes contain useful supplemental information. Appendix A discusses factors to consider during the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of a COIN operation. Appendixes B and C contain supplemental intelligence information. Appendix D addresses legal concerns. Appendix E describes the role of airpower.

Year by year, nation by nation, the United States has relinquished its ability to control events throughout the world. This abdication of global responsibility has created vast power vacuums. The challenge is unmistakably clear: do we control our own destiny and survival, or do others -- others who mean us no good. Our options in dealing with this dilemma are painfully few. At one end there is negotiation and diplomacy; at the other lies the unthinkable--war. Now Theodore Shackley opens up for thoughtful readers another way, a more flexible use of power--the Third Option. In this, one of the most important books of the coming decade, an outstanding intelligence officer and expert on counterinsurgency offers a long-range strategy for America. In broad strokes he pictures the challenge that faces us in the eighties; then he presents a detailed examination of how counterinsurgency can work to protect our interests in a volatile and rapidly changing world. He discusses the phases of insurgency: the cadre phase, using the El Salvador as a case study; the operational phase, using and the covert war phase, using Angola as a case study. Each of these case studies, a valuable lesson in how intelligence services actually operate, reveals how Soviet-backed insurgencies threaten the security of the free world. The challenges and dangers we face require us to view our national security in terms of the interrelationship of political, economic and military factors--if we intend to remain a great power. The message of this book is that we cannot limit our national security to a strictly military or diplomatic alternative. To achieve our foreign policy objectives and to help friendly nations resist subversion we must turn to the Third Option.

This field manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today's operational environment (OE)-an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other doctrinal sources.