The Marine Corps University symposium, "Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond" held on September 23, 2009 at the National Press Club, Washington, DC explored ways to improve counterinsurgency leadership, with particular attention to the leaders of American, Afghan, and Iraqi forces. The Symposium was sponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation.

Since the surge in Iraq in 2007, counterinsurgency (COIN) has been at the forefront of military and foreign affairs debates. Although COIN is not a new idea, the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought renewed attention to its theory and practice as top leaders in both the government and the military have considered the most effective strategy for these conflicts. A symposium cosponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation explored the complexities of COIN leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. From that symposium came these papers, which discuss topics such as brigade and regimental command, officer development in the military, and general officer leadership. Featuring leading COIN theorists and practitioners from the military, academic, and private sectors, this volume sheds new light on past and present COIN operations and points the way toward those in the future. This collection includes material written by David Petraeus and Paula Broadwell. Foreword * Major General Robert B. Neller, USMC * Introduction: Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond * Nicholas J. Schlosser * Part I: Counterinsurgency Leadership * Chapter 1 - Counterinsurgency Leadership: The Key to Afghanistan and Iraq * Mark Moyar * Chapter 2 - Supreme Command in Irregular Warfare * Eliot A. Cohen * Part II: Brigade and Regimental Command * Chapter 3 - The Art of Brigade Command in Counterinsurgency * H. R. McMaster * Chapter 4 - Brigade Command in Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons from the Iraq War * Peter R. Mansoor * Chapter 5 - Regimental Command in Counterinsurgency * W. Blake Crowe * Part III: Battalion Command * Chapter 6 - The Art of Battalion Command in Counterinsurgency: A Discussion * Francis J. "Bing" West * David J. Furness * William M. Jurney * Julian Dale Alford * Part IV: Officer Development in the U.S. Military * Chapter 7 - Officer Development for Counterinsurgency * Nathaniel C. Fick * Chapter 8 - The "Major" Challenge of Junior Officer Leadership Development and Talent Management * Paula D. Broadwell * Chapter 9 - Generalship and Counterinsurgency * Thomas E. Ricks * Part V: Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan * Chapter 10 - Winning in Afghanistan * David W. Barno and John K. Wood * Chapter 11 - Advising Afghan Military Forces * Jeffery M. Haynes * Part VI: The 2009 Afghan Presidential Election * Chapter 12 - The Afghan Election and the Future of Afghanistan's Leadership: A Discussion * Robert D. Kaplan * Clare Lockhart * Amin Tarzi * Jeffrey Gedmin * Part VII: General Officer Leadership in Counterinsurgency * Chapter 13 - A Conversation with General David H. Petraeus

Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown once again the difference that excellent leadership can make in irregular warfare. Thrust unexpectedly into counterinsurgency situations in 2002 and 2003, American commanders had to operate under difficult and constantly changing conditions. Some adapted quickly; others adjusted over a longer period of time with the help of experience and education. Selecting the right commanders became more important than ever to unit effectiveness. We have come a long way in recent years, but opportunities for further improvement in leadership development and command selection remain. The need for leadership goes beyond today's conflicts and lies at the heart of the current debates over the future of our national security organizations and strategy.

The Human Terrain System embedded civilians primarily in brigade combat teams (BCTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2007 and 2014 to act as a collection and dispersal mechanism for sociocultural comprehension. Set against the backdrop of the program's evolution, the experiences of these social scientists clarifies the U.S. Army's decision to integrate social scientists at the tactical level in conflict. Based on interviews, program documents, material from Freedom of Information Act requests, and secondary sources, this book finds a series of limiting factors inhibiting social science research at the tactical level, common to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Complexity in integrating civilians into the military decision-making cycle, in creating timely research with a high level of fidelity, and in making granular research that resonated with brigade staff all contributed to inhibiting the overall effect of the Human Terrain System. Yet, while high operational tempo in contested spaces complicates social science research at the tactical level, the author argues that there is a continued requirement for a residual capability to be maintained by the U.S. Army. Related items: Other resources produced by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1609 Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00431-3 Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-046-00274-6 Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force MARNE in Iraq, 2007-2008 can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00522-1 Iraq and Persian Gulf Wars collection can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/iraq-persian-gulf-wars Training Humans for the Human Domain can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01173-7 Paid to Perform: Aligning Total Military Compensation With Talent Management can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/node/49300/edit The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons From The United Kingdom Reserve Model can be found at this link: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01100-1 Afghanistan War collection can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/wars-conflicts/afghanistan-war

Moyar presents a wide-ranging history of counterinsurgency which draws on the historical record and interviews with hundreds of counterinsurgency veterans. He identifies the ten critical attributes of counterinsurgency leadership and reveals why these attributes have been more prevalent in some organizations than others.

The first book of its kind, Hearts and Minds is a scathing response to the grand narrative of U.S. counterinsurgency, in which warfare is defined not by military might alone but by winning the "hearts and minds" of civilians. Dormant as a tactic since the days of the Vietnam War, in 2006 the U.S. Army drafted a new field manual heralding the resurrection of counterinsurgency as a primary military engagement strategy; counterinsurgency campaigns followed in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the fact that counterinsurgency had utterly failed to account for the actual lived experiences of the people whose hearts and minds America had sought to win. Drawing on leading thinkers in the field and using key examples from Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Hearts and Minds brings a long-overdue focus on the many civilians caught up in these conflicts. Both urgent and timely, this important book challenges the idea of a neat divide between insurgents and the populations from which they emerge—and should be required reading for anyone engaged in the most important contemporary debates over U.S. military policy.