The authors argue that the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) should pursue firm deterrence of North Korean nuclear weapon use--which might soon pose a serious threat to the United States and the ROK--rather than relying on negotiations.

As North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile arsenals grow larger and more sophisticated, the United States could soon be faced with a terrible choice when Pyongyang attempts to coerce Seoul—risk an intercontinental nuclear war or abandon a key ally. To avoid such as scenario, the author recommends that Washington adopt a new strategy to proactively counter North Korea’s nuclear threat by impeding its nuclear and missile programs, investing to stay ahead of its arsenal, and adjusting military operations on the Korean Peninsula.

This book explains the origin and historical development of North Korean nuclear weapon dated from the aftermath of World War II. The story of North Korea's nuclear program began when the United States dropped atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 which led to Japan's immediate defeat. Surprised by the speed of Japan's surrender, North Korea's founding leader Kim Il-sung vowed to secure nuclear capability to avoid suffering the fate of its eastern neighbor. Based on the author's extensive experience in the academia, government, and intelligence circles, the book traces how the nuclear program has evolved since and explores wide-ranging issues including the positive function of nuclear weapon in Pyongyang's local politics, the history of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, the prospects of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, the diplomatic and military options presented to US President Donald Trump in dealing with the nuclear threat, and the future scenarios of the North Korean regime and the possibilities of a reunified Korea.With the nuclear weapon crisis likely to persist in the foreseeable time, is it feasible for South Korea to achieve reunification in the Korean Peninsula? Will the six-party members like the US, China, Russia and Japan agree with reunification without denuclearization? Can the issues of nuclear weapon and unification be settled simultaneously in the future? The book seeks to address these questions and more.

For many years, North Korea's nuclear weapons program has been a concern. In 2016, North Korea conducted two tests of an atomic weapon and 20 separate tests of their intercontinental ballistic missile system, including a test in which a submarine fired an ICBM. North Korea is trying to miniaturize the size of their nuclear weapons in order to fit a nuclear warhead on an ICMB. With each test, the North Koreans learn more about how to perfect their illegal weapons, and with each test our allies in Seoul and Tokyo are reminded of just how dangerous their neighborhood has become. That's why the South Korean Government is moving ahead with the deployment of a THAAD anti-ballistic missile, a purely defensive system. This threat is not limited to Northeast Asia. The best minds working on this problem agree that North Korea is just a few years or even less from a weapon that could reach the United States. There is a critically short period of time left to stop that from happening.

North Korea is perilously close to developing strategic nuclear weapons capable of hitting the United States and its East Asian allies. Since their first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea has struggled to perfect the required delivery systems. Kim Jong-un’s regime now appears to be close, however. Sung Chull Kim, Michael D. Cohen, and the volume contributors contend that the time to prevent North Korea from achieving this capability is virtually over; scholars and policymakers must turn their attention to how to deter a nuclear North Korea. The United States, South Korea, and Japan must also come to terms with the fact that North Korea will be able to deter them with its nuclear arsenal. How will the erratic Kim Jong-un behave when North Korea develops the capability to hit medium- and long-range targets with nuclear weapons? How will and should the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China respond, and what will this mean for regional stability in the short term and long term? The international group of authors in this volume address these questions and offer a timely analysis of the consequences of an operational North Korean nuclear capability for international security.

Iran and North Korea are the most destabilizing players in their respective territories, and their governments are among the most authoritarian in the world. Iran and North Korea pose large and multifaceted threats to the United States and its allies. The threat posed by Iran and North Korea is exacerbated by their cooperation, particularly in the areas of nuclear and ballistic missile production. This book reveals how North Korea has changed under Kim Jong-Un, who has conducted more missile tests than both his father and grandfather combined in just 5 years in power, and the world's thunderous guffaws are slowly fading. This book also exposes the efforts of western nations and especially the U.S. The US must monitor Iranian efforts to outsource elements of its illicit nuclear program to North Korea and seek to prevent a North Korean pathway to an Iranian nuclear bomb--or an Iranian pathway to a ballistic missile delivery mechanism for a North Korean bomb.

This thesis evaluates three U.S. policy options for North Korean nuclear weapons: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according to four criteria: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), U.S. policy costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows that diplomacy will fail to achieve U.S. objectives for three reasons: lack of trust, DPRK reluctance to permit transparency, and the difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive diplomacy. Ultimately, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's question must be answered: "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons?" If Washington is unwilling to back a threat of military force, it should not risk coercive diplomacy. Likewise, U.S. leaders may need to decide between maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance and eliminating North Korean nuclear weapons.