The proto-phase of an insurgency is the time during which a fledgling insurgent movement seeks to gather the resources, expertise, and organizational capacity to wage a violent, credible, effective campaign against a governing authority. Whereas a full-scale insurgency enjoys momentum, some population support, and a concomitant inertia that makes it hard to decisively defeat, a proto-insurgency is weak, and should be relatively easy to defeat. In this paper, I build on Dr. Daniel Byman's ground-breaking work on proto-insurgencies to explore the dynamics of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's successful proto-insurgency in Iraq against the United States, between 2003 and 2004. I argue that three primary factors account for a rapid transition to a full-scale insurgency: the adoption of violent shortcut strategies, such as Che Guevara's foco strategy, modified to leverage local, as well as foreign fighters; strategic pre-positioning that aids political acceptability and the attraction of foreign fighters; and the dearth of counterinsurgent forces and resources. The underlying premise is that by more effectively understanding proto-insurgencies, we will be better equipped to detect and defeat them, thereby allowing us to avoid resource-intensive campaigns against full-scale insurgencies and preserve our strategic freedom-of-action.

This study examines how terrorist groups transition to insurgencies and identifies ways to combat proto-insurgents. It describes the steps groups must take to gain the size and capabilities of insurgencies, the role of outside state support, and actions governments can take to prevent potential insurgencies from blossoming. The most effective U.S. counterinsurgency action would be to anticipate the possibility of insurgencies developing; it could then provide training and advisory programs and inhibit outsides support.

In 2019, Islamic State lost its last remaining sliver of territory in Syria, and its Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed. These setbacks seemed to herald the Caliphate's death knell, and many now forecast its imminent demise. Yet its affiliates endure, particularly in Africa: nearly all of Islamic State's cells on the continent have reaffirmed their allegiance, attacks have continued in its name, many groups have been reinvigorated, and a new province has emerged. Why, in Africa, did the two major setbacks of 2019 have so little impact on support for Islamic State? The Islamic State in Africa suggests that this puzzle can be explained by the emergence and evolution of Islamic State's provinces in Africa, which it calls 'sovereign subordinates'. By examining the rise and development of eight Islamic State 'cells', the authors show how, having pledged allegiance to IS Central, cells evolved mostly autonomously, using the IS brand as a means for accrual of power, but, in practice, receiving relatively little if any direction or material support from central command. Given this pattern, IS Central's relative decline has had little impact on its African affiliates-who are likely to remain committed to the Caliphate's cause for the foreseeable future.

This volume of case studies examines the rise in violent extremism, terrorism and insurgency in South and South East Asia, and subsequent state responses. The South and South East of Asia has experienced various forms of extremism and violence for years, with a growing demand for academic or policy-relevant work that will enhance understanding of the reasons behind this. The violent challenges in this area have taken a variety of forms and are often exacerbated by lack of governance, tie-ins to existing regional criminal networks, colonial legacies and a presence of international terrorist movements. Written by experts with field experience, this volume analyzes the key element of successful response as the appropriate application of doctrine following nuanced assessment of threat. In practice, this often means counterinsurgency doctrine. The essays also analyze the need for irregular war practitioners to systematically examine the changing character of intrastate violent irregular challenges. The volume fills a gap in the understanding of patterns, drivers, organizations and ideologies of various insurgent and terrorist groups, and state responses. It also provides a set of recommendations for addressing the unfolding situation. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and political violence, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, Asian politics and security studies in general.

Insurgency may be the most prevalent type of armed conflict since the organization of political communities. This systematic format for analyzing and comparing insurgency is designed for use by observers, scholars, students, military personnel, and government analysts.

"The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report's recommendations are based on the premise that counterinsurgency (COIN) is a contest for the allegiance of a nation's population; victory over jihadist insurgency consists not of merely winning a war against terrorists but of persuading Islamic populations to choose legitimate government and reject violent religious tyranny. The authors evaluate three types of COIN capabilities: civil capabilities to help weak states improve their political and economic performance; informational and cognitive capabilities to enable better governance and improve COIN decisionmaking; and security capabilities to protect people and infrastructure and to weaken insurgent forces. Gompert and Gordon warn that U.S. capabilities are deficient in several critical areas but also emphasize that U.S. allies and international organizations can provide capabilities that the United States currently cannot. The authors conclude by outlining the investments, organizational changes within the federal government and the military, and international arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities."--(Publisher's website)