Explores current debates around religious extremism as a means to understand and re-think the connections between terrorism, insurgency and state failure. Using case studies of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, she develops a better understanding of the underlying causes and conditions necessary for terrorism and insurgency to occur.

Insurgency may be the most prevalent type of armed conflict since the organization of political communities. This systematic format for analyzing and comparing insurgency is designed for use by observers, scholars, students, military personnel, and government analysts.

This volume shows us that in order to deal with today’s Fourth Generation asymmetric warfare by terrorist groups using conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction, we need a new ‘global networked’ approach. The contributors examine the various attempts that have been made to counter the latest wave of terrorism, including the US strikes against Afghanistan and Iraq, President George W. Bush's declaration of a ‘war against terrorism’, the creation of the US Department of Homeland Security, and the 9/11 Commission. Drawing from our experience with ‘Terrorism Early Warning’ and the co-production of counter-terrorism intelligence, this book explains the need for such a network and shows how it could be formed. It compiles the opinions of experts from clinical medicine, public policy, law enforcement and the military. These expert contributors identify the nature of a global counter-terrorism network, show how it could be created, and provide clear guidelines for gauging its future effectiveness. This book will be of great interest to all students of terrorism studies, US national security, international relations, and political science in general.

'This book makes uncomfortable reading both in its detailed analysis of terrorism and its causes, and in the critique of state responses, particularly in modern times. It is unusual to have such a defence of a 'human rights framework' from a counter-terrorism practitioner rather than from within the legal fraternity. It is this that makes the case even more persuasive. All who are involved in counter-terrorism strategy should consider carefully the arguments put forward.'Global Policy JournalFor more than 150 years, nationalist, populist, Marxist and religious terrorists have all been remarkably consistent and explicit about their aims: provoke states into over-reacting to the threat they pose, then take advantage of the divisions in society that result. Yet, state after state falls into the trap that terrorists have set for them. Faced with a major terrorist threat, governments seem to reach instinctively for the most coercive tools at their disposal and, in doing so, risk exacerbating the situation. This policy response seems to be driven in equal parts by a lack of understanding in the true nature of the threat, an exaggerated faith in the use of force, and a lack of faith that democratic values are sufficiently flexible to allow for an effective counter-terrorism response. Drawing on a wealth of data from both historical and contemporary sources, Avoiding the Terrorist Trap addresses common misconceptions underpinning flawed counter-terrorist policies, identifies the core strategies that guide terrorist operations, consolidates the latest research on the underlying drivers of terrorist violence, and then demonstrates why a counter-terrorism strategy grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law is the most effective approach to defeating terrorism.

This book illustrates how Africa’s defence and security domains have been radically altered by drastic changes in world politics and local ramifications. First, the contributions of numerous authors highlight the transnational dimensions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Africa and reveal the roles played by African states and regional organisations in the global war on terror. Second, the volume critically evaluates the emerging regional architectures of countering terrorism, insurgency, and organised violence on the continent through the African Union Counterterrorism Framework (AU-CTF) and Regional Security Complexes (RSC). Third, the book sheds light on the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (CT-COIN) structures and mechanisms established by specific African states to contain, degrade, and eliminate terrorism, insurgency, and organised violence on the continent, particularly the successes, constraints, and challenges of the emerging CT-COIN mechanisms. Finally, the volume highlights the entry of non-state actors – such as civil society, volunteer groups, private security companies, and defence contractors – into the theatre of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Africa through volunteerism, community support for state-led CT-COIN Operations, and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). This book will be of use to students and scholars of security studies, African studies, international relations, and terrorism studies, and to practitioners of development, defence, security, and strategy.

What do we know about effectively countering terrorism? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counter terrorism campaigns? This title addresses these and related questions, contributing to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the terrorist threat and how it can be defeated.

Since September 2001, the United States has waged what the government initially called the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Beginning in late 2005 and early 2006, the term Long War began to appear in U.S. security documents such as the National Security Council's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and in statements by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. The description Long War—unlimited in time and space and continuing for decades—is closer to reality and more useful than GWOT. Colonel Robert Cassidy argues that this protracted struggle is more correctly viewed as a global insurgency and counterinsurgency. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, he maintains, comprise a novel and evolving form of networked insurgents who operate globally, harnessing the advantages of globalization and the information age. They employ terrorism as a tactic, subsuming terror within their overarching aim of undermining the Western-dominated system of states. Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency has vital implications for doctrine, interagency coordination, and military cultural change-all reviewed in this important work. Cassidy combines the foremost maxims of the most prominent Western philosopher of war and the most renowned Eastern philosopher of war to arrive at a threefold theme: know the enemy, know yourself, and know what kind of war you are embarking upon. To help readers arrive at that understanding, he first offers a distilled analysis of al Qaeda and its associated networks, with a particular focus on ideology and culture. In subsequent chapters, he elucidates the challenges big powers face when they prosecute counterinsurgencies, using historical examples from Russian, American, British, and French counterinsurgent wars before 2001. The book concludes with recommendations for the integration and command and control of indigenous forces and other agencies.