This book addresses new technologies being considered by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for screening airport passengers for concealed weapons and explosives. The FAA is supporting the development of promising new technologies that can reveal the presence not only of metal-based weapons as with current screening technologies, but also detect plastic explosives and other non-metallic threat materials and objects, and is concerned that these new technologies may not be appropriate for use in airports for other than technical reasons. This book presents discussion of the health, legal, and public acceptance issues that are likely to be raised regarding implementation of improvements in the current electromagnetic screening technologies, implementation of screening systems that detect traces of explosive materials on passengers, and implementation of systems that generate images of passengers beneath their clothes for analysis by human screeners.

Incidents of airport workers using access privileges to smuggle weapons through secured airport areas and onto planes have heightened concerns regarding commercial airport security. The Transportation Security Admin. (TSA), along with airports, is responsible for security at TSA-regulated airports. To guide risk assessment and protection of critical infrastructure, including airports, the Nat. Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was developed. This report examined the extent to which, for airport perimeters and access controls, TSA: (1) assessed risk consistent with the NIPP; (2) implemented protective programs, and evaluated its worker screening pilots; and (3) established a strategy to guide decision making. Includes recommend. Illus.

The response of the U.S. federal government to the events of September 11, 2001 has reflected the challenge of striking a balance between implementing security measures to deter terrorist attacks while at the same time limiting disruption to air commerce. Airport and Aviation Security: U.S. Policy and Strategy in the Age of Global Terrorism is a co

In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of post-9/11 homeland security expenses--which have risen by more than a trillion dollars, not including war costs--the common query has been, "Are we safer?" This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are "safer"--the posting of a single security guard at one building's entrance enhances safety. The correct question is, "Are any gains in security worth the funds expended?"In this engaging, readable book, John Mueller and Mark Stewart apply risk and cost-benefit evaluation techniques to answer this very question. This analytical approach has been used throughout the world for decades by regulators, academics, and businesses--but, as a recent National Academy of Science study suggests, it has never been capably applied by the people administering homeland security funds. Given the limited risk terrorism presents, expenses meant to lower it have for the most part simply not been worth it. For example, to be considered cost-effective, increased American homeland security expenditures would have had each year to have foiled up to 1,667 attacks roughly like the one intended on Times Square in 2010--more than four a day. Cataloging the mistakes that the US has made--and continues to make--in managing homeland security programs, Terror, Security, and Money has the potential to redirect our efforts toward a more productive and far more cost-effective course.

The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 highlighted the importance of detecting improvised explosive devices on passengers. This testimony focuses on: (1) the Transportation Security Admin.¿s (TSA) efforts to procure and deploy advanced imaging technology (AIT), and related challenges; and (2) TSA¿s efforts to strengthen screening procedures and technology in other areas of aviation security, and related challenges. This testimony is based on related reports issued from March 2009 through Jan. 2010, selected updates conducted from Dec. 2009 through March 2010 on the AIT procurement, and ongoing work on air cargo security. Illustrations.

Making aviation security more cost-effective is hampered by considerable uncertainty about the terrorist threat, security system performance, and the costs of security measures. This volume focuses on exploring ways to inform decisionmaking despite such uncertainties, providing a set of analyses that help fill some of the current gaps in the assessment of the costs, benefits, and efficiency of aviation security measures and strategies.