In this revealing study Frank Lichtenberg uses Census Bureau and other data on hundreds of business transactions during the 1970s and 1980s to examine the effects of changes in corporate control on productivity. The 1980s saw explosive activity in the arena of corporate takeovers. In this revealing study Frank Lichtenberg uses Census Bureau and other data on hundreds of business transactions during the 1970s and 1980s to examine the effects of changes in corporate control on productivity. He concludes that the restructuring of the U.S. economy during the past decade has contributed to higher productivity and increased international competitiveness. Corporate Takeovers and Productivity examines the effects of mergers and acquisitions, in general, and leveraged buyouts, in particular on a number of important, interrelated variables: on the productivity and market share of manufacturing plants, on fixed and R&D investment, on the employment and wages of both blue- and white-collar workers, and on corporate diversification. Among Lichtenberg's findings are that the least productive plants are most likely to change owners - a change that tends to raise productivity performance; that takeovers significantly reduce the employment and wages of white-collar workers (except R&D personnel) but not of blue-collar workers; that industrial consolidation is one source of the productivity gains from takeovers; and that the U.S. LBOs and foreign mergers and acquisitions do not have the same effects as U.S. mergers and acquisitions.

Speculative news on corporate takeovers may hurt productivity because uncertainty and threat of job loss cause anxiety, distraction, and reduced collaboration and morale among employees and managers. Using a panel of OECD-headquartered firms, we show that firm productivity temporarily declines upon announcements of speculative takeover rumors that do not materialize. This productivity dip is more pronounced for targets and for firms in countries with weaker employee rights and less long-term orientation. Abnormal stock returns mirror these results. The evidence fosters our understanding of potential real effects of speculative financial news and the costs of takeover threats.

This volume examines critical issues in the debate over the effects' of the current wave of corporate takeovers. Media accounts are often sensational, but proposed public policy remedies need to be evaluated on the basis of more than simple rhetoric. The studies contained in this collection provide solid economic grounding for the debate. Public Policy Toward Corporate Takeovers is the result of extensive research sponsored by the Center for the Study of American Business and directed by Murray Weidenbaum; it examines key aspects of takeovers: the evolving regulatory role of the Antitrust Division, state versus federal authority over offensive and defensive takeover maneuvers, whether leveraged buyouts improve the firm's economic performance, and the validity of assertions about "entrenched" managements. The book also includes the views of the most publicized corporate raider, T. Boone Pickens. Balancing Pickens' highly favorable view of the value of hostile takeovers as a disciplining factor for subpar management performance is a chapter by David Ravenscraft of the Federal Trade Commission, who takes a long-term viewpoint and argues that the popular belief that takeovers create substantial efficiencies has not been borne out by the record. The overall findings do not fully support either side of the takeover controversy. The book presents both legal and economic perspectives, and suggests strategies for government policymakers as well as leaders of private enterprise.

The takeover boom that began in the mid-1980s has exhibited many phenomena not previously observed, such as hostile takeovers and takeover defenses, a widespread use of cash as a means of payment for targeted firms, and the acquisitions of companies ranking among the largest in the country. With the aim of more fully understanding the implications of such occurances, contributors to this volume consider a broad range of issues as they analyze mergers and acquisitions and study the takeoveer process itself.

This paper investigates how takeovers create value. Using plant-level data, I show that acquirers increase targets' productivity through more efficient use of capital and labor. Acquirers significantly reduce capital expenditures, wages, and employment in target plants, though output is unchanged. Acquirers improve targets'investment efficiency through better capital reallocation. Moreover, changes in productivity help explain the merging firms' announcement returns. The combined announcement returns are driven by improvements in target's productivity. Targets with greater productivity improvements receive higher premiums. These results provide some first empirical evidence on the relation between productivity and stock returns in the context of takeovers.

Event studies on announcement-period stock returns have found that takeovers are expected to improve firm performance, yet the dominant finding in the existing literature on post-takeover long-term performance is that mergers destroy corporate value. This paper examines this apparent contradiction by developing a new benchmark methodology which is based on forecasts of performance and a control portfolio matched to the event firms on the basis of expected future performance and other exogenous variables. This benchmark captures what the performance of the bidder and target firms would have been had the merger not occurred, and controls for many of the inherent problems due to endogeneity (of the decision to merge) found with other approaches taken in the literature. I find that the long- term post-takeover performance of the merged firm is better than it would have been without the merger. The method is verified by examining the performance of a portfolio of canceled takeovers, where no effect is found.

The takeover process - The legal and regulatory framework - Accounting for M & As - Tax planning options - Strategic processes - Theories of mergers and tender offers - A chemical industry case study - Measurement of abnormal returns - The timing of merger activity - Empirical tests of M & A performance - Alternative approaches to valuation - Foundations of DCF spreadsheet valuation - Derivation of revenue growth valuation formulas - Derivation of investment opportunity valuation formulas - Increasing the value of the organization - Restructuring and divestitures - Restructuring organization and ownership relationships - Financial restructuring - Joint ventures and alliances - ESOPs and MLPs - Going private and leveraged buyouts - International takeovers and restructuring Share repurchade - Takeover defenses - Corporate governance and performance - Implementation and management guides for M & As.