The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.

The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the ‘missing links’ in the ownership structure–firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm’s financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues of the firm, including ownership structure, agency problems, corporate risk management and financial performance.

After the global financial crisis, the topic of corporate governance has been gaining momentum in accounting and finance literature since it may influence firm and bank management in many countries. Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance provides emerging research exploring the implications of a good corporate governance system after global financial crises. Corporate governance mechanisms may include board and audit committee characteristics, ownership structure, and internal and external auditing. This book is devoted to all topics dealing with corporate governance including corporate governance characteristics, board diversity, CSR, big data governance, bitcoin governance, IT governance, and governance disclosure, and is ideally designed for executives, BODs, financial analysts, government officials, researchers, policymakers, academicians, and students.

This paper attempts to review literature on corporate governance on the ownership structure from a firm performance perspective. The dominant paradigm of corporate governance is based on the argument of Berle and Means (1932) that separation of ownership and control affects the reported level of income of firms, either positively or negatively. Subsequent studies have taken off from this concept of separation of ownership and control or in what is otherwise more famously known as 'conflict of interests' theory. Seven major arguments that have emerged within the context of 'conflict of interests' theory are explained in this paper. These arguments are basically considered to have emerged as an explanation to discuss the motivations that govern the managers and owners running the corporations. The uniqueness of the paper is in the way the literature is organized. As alluded earlier, corporate governance within the conflict of interests framework is subject to behavioral motivations of those who run the corporations. The profoundness of conflict of interests lies in where the locus of control is - with the managers, the owners, the institutional investors or with the markets. Hence, the literature has been classified under a few major headings to explain the importance of 'locus of control' and its impacts on firm's performance. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in the summary.

This study examines the relationship between ownership structures and the performance of listed Thai financial firms, using a sample of 39 companies which is accounted for 86% of the market capitalisation of all financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 1996. The study employs both univariate and multivariate regression analysis. The empirical results reveal that the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher performance, particularly when measured, for example, by return on equity (ROE). This evidence is consistent with the view that large shareholders mitigate the “free-rider” problem of monitoring a management team, and reduce agency costs, as contended by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Admati et al. (1994). In addition, the separation of voting and cash-flow rights through the use of pyramid and cross-shareholding is not detrimental to the value of a firm. The study does not find evidence to support the argument that a family’s involvement in management has a negative effect on company performance. Rather, there is strong evidence to support the hypotheses that state-owned financial institutions display superior performance. Finally, the study does not find evidence to support the argument that there is a non-monotonic relationship between ownership concentration and company value. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that, at higher levels of ownership (in this case 50-75%), the involvement in management by controlling shareholders has a positive effect on firm performance, in terms of accounting, ROE, and market measures, price-to-book ratio. The results add to the literature that evaluates an empirical the link between ownership structure and firm performance, and provide additional information to policy-makers engaged in the ongoing development of corporate governance in developing countries, particularly in Thailand.

Do corporate governance practices affect firm performance? Are shareholders willing to pay a premium for higher governance standards? How does the ownership structure of a firm affect its corporate governance practices and firm performance? This book investigates whether differences in the quality of firm-level corporate governance affects firm performance. Constructing a broad corporate governance index for listed Turkish companies, it is documented that there is a positive relationship between governance scores and Tobin's Q as a measure for firm performance. Firms with better corporate governance scores in the model used in this book have higher firm values, which implies that firms can increase shareholder value by restructuring their corporate governance standards. The analysis also sheds light on the impact of ownership structure on stock performance. Listed companies withhigher corporate governance scores and higher foreign ownership ratios experienced a smaller reduction in their share prices during the equity market crash in Turkey parallel to the global equity markets between 2008 and 2009.